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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Following the Arab Spring protests in the Middle East and North 
Africa that spread in 2011, the completion of new constitutions be-
came a hallmark of the political transitions in those countries— 
Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Yemen—where authoritarian leaders 
were toppled. The Arab Spring uprisings began in late December 
2010, when Mohamed Bouazizi, a fruit vendor in Tunisia set himself 
on fire to protest his mistreatment by Tunisian authorities.1  His ac-
tion was a flashpoint for longstanding grievances that people within 
the Middle East and North African (MENA) region held against 
their governments.  In response, protests spread throughout the 
MENA region.  Protesters demanded the removal of authoritarian 
regimes and economic, democratic, and human rights reforms.2  The 
protests led to the toppling of authoritarian leaders in Egypt and 
Tunisia.  As part of their political transitions, Egypt and Tunisia 
completed new constitutions in 2014, refining their internal social 
compacts between the citizen and the state.  The constitution-mak-
ing processes unfolded in each country quite differently.  In Tunisia, 
the constitutional re-calibration was broadly participatory and 
transparent which augured well for constitutional legitimacy and 
democratic advance, whereas in Egypt the re-calibration was exclu-
sive and closed, risking illegitimacy and a continued lack of account-
ability for state actors.3  In Libya and Yemen, the political transitions 
                                                   
1  Marc Fisher, In Tunisia, Act of One Fruit Vendor Sparks Wave of Revolution 
Through Arab World, WASH. POST (Mar. 26, 2011), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/world/in-tunisia-act-of-one-fruit-vendor-sparks-wave-of-revolu-
tion-through-arab-world/2011/03/16/AFjfsueB_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/M5XT-JGW9].  
2  For an overview of the Arab Spring protests, see generally Katerina  
Dalacoura, The 2011 Uprisings in the Arab Middle East: Political Change and Geopolitical 
Implications, 88 INT’L AFF. 63 (2012). 
3  See generally Darin E.W. Johnson, Beyond Constituent Assemblies and Referenda: 
Assessing the Legitimacy of the Arab Spring Constitutions in Egypt and Tunisia, 50 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 1007 (2015) (highlighting the differences in constitution-making pro-
cesses resulting from the Arab Spring between Egypt and Tunisia). 
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heralded by the Arab Spring devolved into civil wars that are ongo-
ing at the time of writing of this article.4  These civil wars have re-
sulted in over 5,800 deaths5 in Libya and over 10,000 deaths6 in 
Yemen.  As a consequence of these devastating civil wars, constitu-
tional reform processes which were intended to cement political 
transitions from authoritarianism to democracy were instead held 
hostage by the armed perpetrators of the protracted civil conflicts.  
As the political transitions in Libya and Yemen devolved into civil 
war, the constitution-making processes also devolved into conflict 
over the same outcomes that armed elites sought on the battlefield 
by force.  These armed actors discovered a new battlefront in Yemen 
and Libya’s constituent debates. 
Comparative constitutional scholarship has emphasized the im-
portance of participatory constitution-making as a post-conflict tool 
for political transition.  However, ongoing violent conflict frustrates 
open, transparent, inclusive and participatory processes—the hall-
marks of participatory constitution-making.7  The violent intensity 
of the civil conflicts in Yemen and Libya undermined the concilia-
tory objectives of participatory constitution-making in both coun-
tries. The undermining of conciliatory processes, in turn, imperiled 
the creation of consensus constitutional texts and risked the creation 
of “conflict constitutions” that would prolong, rather than remedy, 
the sources of conflict. 
                                                   
4  The “civil wars” in Libya and Yemen began after the NATO intervention 
supporting the Libyan opposition’s ouster of Mohamed Qadaffi in Libya, and after 
the UN and US-brokered departure of President Hadi in Yemen.  Although civil 
conflict occurred immediately following the Arab Spring uprisings in both coun-
tries, the “civil wars” discussed in this piece began in 2014 when dual governments 
in each country arose, violently clashing with one another and claiming authority 
in the wake of the initial Arab Spring political transitions.  The civil wars are dis-
cussed in detail in Parts III and IV.  
5  Violent Deaths in 2014, 2015, and 2016 Libya Body Count, SQUARE SPACE (Feb. 
24, 2017, 7:00 PM), http://www.libyabodycount.org/table 
[https://perma.cc/63X7-SZBA]. 
6  Mohammed Ghobari, At Least 10,000 Killed in Yemen Civil War, REUTERS (Aug. 
30, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-toll/u-n-says-
10000-killed-in-yemen-war-far-more-than-other-estimates-idUSKCN11516W 
[https://perma.cc/3RX2-ASRE] (quoting U.N. Humanitarian Coordinator Jamie 
McGoldrick’s reporting of U.N.-acquired information from medical facilities in 
Yemen). 
7 See Vivien Hart, Constitution-Making and the Transformation of Con-
flict, 26 PEACE & CHANGE 153 (2001) (examining the constitution-making process 
and its contribution to the transformation of conflicts).  
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The impact of violent civil conflict on concurrent constitution-
making processes and the constitutions that they produce has been 
under-examined in comparative constitutional scholarship and this 
article seeks to fill that gap.  In this article, I develop a conceptual 
theory of “conflict constitution-making” that assesses the impact of 
civil war on constitution-making processes and the resultant consti-
tutions, and I apply that theory to the events in Libya and Yemen.  
My theory of conflict constitution-making draws from comparative 
constitutional scholarship and posits that civil war transforms con-
stitution-making processes from zones of conciliation into zones of 
conflict. During civil war, unless a political détente can be reached 
that commits armed actors to a consensual and participatory consti-
tution-making process, armed power brokers exploit the process 
and drive constitution-makers away from accommodation and into 
conflict. Such a conflict constitution-making process produces a 
“conflict constitution” that enshrines rather than ameliorates the 
sources of conflict. 
An exploration of the impact of violent civil conflict on constitu-
tion-making is critical because, although best practice calls for the 
creation of a constitution only after the cessation of hostilities, polit-
ical transitions are often fluid and constitution-making processes 
undertaken during periods of relative peace may continue during 
periods of extreme violence (as seen in Libya and Yemen, discussed 
infra).  A better understanding of the impact of violence on constitu-
tion-making processes will better enable citizens, scholars and prac-
titioners to assess, and if necessary, reform those processes as well 
as the constitutions created by them.  While participatory constitu-
tion-making is the aspirational ideal, conflict constitution-making 
may increasingly become the reality in transitioning states.  Accord-
ingly, an understanding of how to best remedy a “conflict constitu-
tion-making” process is one of the goals of this piece. 
In examining the events of Libya and Yemen, I conclude that 
during violent civil war, unless a political agreement is achieved that 
commits armed actors to a consensual constitution-making process, 
armed actors will exploit existing constitution-making processes for 
their own ends, increasing the likelihood that provisions of the re-
sulting constitution will contribute to the persistence rather than the 
resolution of the underlying conflicts.  In Libya, constitution-making 
processes were stymied by internal conflict but a United Nations 
(“UN”)-brokered political agreement created renewed space for 
armed actors to support the constituent assembly and a unified state 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss2/1
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under the new constitution.  In Yemen, the National Dialogue’s fail-
ure to achieve political consensus with powerful factions on funda-
mental issues catalyzed a civil war that undermined the work of 
constitutional drafters and threatened the long-term viability of the 
draft constitution.  These conflict processes led to draft constitutions 
that were not accepted by major constituencies in both countries.  
For the constitutions to contribute to societal cohesion, rather than 
conflict, peace must be brokered outside of the constitution-making 
process, and remedial measures must be undertaken to increase 
broad public engagement and support for the constitutions.  Fur-
ther, the constitutional texts themselves must be modified to include 
measures that support multiethnic and moderate political represen-
tation that can sustain peace over time and prevent relapses into 
civil war. 
Section 2 of the Article provides an overview of approaches to 
constitution-making in transitioning countries and defines my the-
ory of conflict constitution-making.  Section 3 assesses the constitu-
tion-making process in Libya in light of this theory of conflict con-
stitution-making.  Section 4 assesses the conflict constitution-
making process in Yemen.  Section 5 discusses constitutional design 
options for addressing the sectarian and regional divisions that 
drive intrastate conflict.  Section 6 examines the features of the draft 
constitutions created in Libya and Yemen considering these design 
options.  Section 7 offers recommendations on how the constitution-
making processes and draft constitutions in Libya and Yemen can 
be modified to mitigate future conflict.  Section 8 concludes. 
 
2.  CONSTITUTION-MAKING IN TRANSITIONING STATES 
 
Constitutions are foundational documents that seek to define the 
social compact between the state and the citizen.  Accordingly, con-
stitutional reform in transitioning states frequently signals a transi-
tion from authoritarianism to democracy, colonialism to independ-
ence, or from conflict to peace.  Constitution-making during periods 
of political transition, brought on by political revolution or civil con-
flict has been referred to as transitional constitutionalism or transi-
tional constitution-making.8  Transitional constitution-making seeks 
                                                   
8  Ruti Teitel, Transitional Jurisprudence: The Role of Law in Political Transfor-
mation, 106 YALE L. J. 2009, 2052 (1997). 
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to define state powers and citizen rights, create a national polity and 
bolster state stability in states where conflict and division have pre-
vented the effective accomplishment of those goals.  Much of the 
scholarship on modern constitution-making during periods of tran-
sition has emphasized the importance of a participatory constitu-
tion-making process, which involves wide-spread public participa-
tion and transparency, as the most effective tool for ensuring 
legitimate and effective constitutional reform in transitioning 
states.9  Transitional constitution-making has been undertaken in a 
wide range of circumstances, from political revolutions brought on 
by non-violent protests, to transitions following long-term civil 
wars, to transitions brought on by military intervention and foreign 
occupation.10  Constitutional scholars and practitioners have advo-
cated for participatory constitution-making because it can aid in 
constitutional legitimacy and effectiveness in transitioning states. 
However, the hallmarks of participatory constitution-making—
open, transparent, public, and inclusive processes—are constrained 
by violent civil war.  In the most extreme instances, civil war can 
make constitution-making processes another site of battle, where 
armed actors exploit constitution-making processes to further their 
aims. When this occurs, the constitution-making process is trans-
formed into a “conflict constitution-making” process more likely to 
exacerbate rather than reconcile conflict.  The attributes of participa-
tory and conflict constitution-making are examined below. 
 
2.1.  Participatory Constitution-Making 
 
Participatory constitution-making describes a set of transparent 
and inclusive drafting processes that have been utilized in post-con-
flict or transitioning states to ensure broad societal acceptance of a 
new regime or constitutional order that follows a political revolution 
or the resolution of a civil conflict.11  Since the late twentieth century, 
                                                   
9  Hart, supra note 7; Kirsti Samuels, Post-Conflict Peace-Building and Constitu-
tion-Making, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 663, 663–64 (2006). 
10  Examples of the different circumstances under which transitional constitu-
tion-making can occur include Tunisia (non-violent political revolution), South Af-
rica (long-term civil war), and Iraq (military intervention and foreign occupation). 
11  See Hart, supra note 7 (describing the importance of constitutions and the 
process of constitution-making to completing the establishment of a new political 
order). 
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constitution-making following conflict has trended towards greater 
transparency, citizen engagement, and inclusivity.12  Such participa-
tory constitution-making encourages the inclusive “participation” 
of a diverse citizenry in the process.13  Scholars have advocated for 
participatory constitution-making in post-conflict and transitioning 
states in order to resolve long-standing disputes by fostering con-
sensus among a diverse array of groups on national principles and 
by addressing the concerns of previously marginalized citizens.14  
For example, participatory constitution-making was successfully 
utilized in Tunisia following the Arab Spring and in South Africa 
following decades-long civil strife between minority groups and the 
apartheid government.15  These participatory constitution-making 
processes were largely viewed as legitimate because they were de-
liberative, transparent, occurred in phases, and provided oppor-
tunity for public feedback, participation, and acceptance (either di-
rectly or through elected representatives) among a diverse array of 
citizens with divergent racial, religious, and ideological back-
grounds.16  Participatory processes have frequently been “post-con-
flict” tools that have followed or been concomitant with the resolu-
tion of a political revolution or violent civil conflict.  This approach 
follows best practice which calls for a cessation of hostilities and po-
litical settlement prior to the initiation of an effective participatory 
constitution-making process.17 
                                                   
12  For example, transition leaders in an array of countries, including Kenya, 
Uganda, Brazil, Thailand, Papua New Guinea, and South Africa have utilized par-
ticipatory constitution-making processes.  Jason Gluck & Michele Brandt, U.S. In-
stitute for Peace, Participatory and Inclusive Constitution Making: Giving Voice to the 
Demands of Citizens in the Wake of the Arab Spring, 105 PEACEWORKS 5, 5-6 (2015), 
http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PW105-Participatory-and-Inclusive-
Constitution-Making.pdf [https://perma.cc/JJ6G-NZVT]. 
13  Angela M. Banks, Expanding Participation in Constitution Making: Challenges 
and Opportunities, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1043–1048 (2008). 
14  Id. at 1046–1048; Hart, supra note 7, at 154; Gluck & Brandt, supra note 12, at 
5–6. 
15  See generally Johnson, supra note 3 (discussing the constitution-making pro-
cesses in conflicted regions); Ziyad Motala, Constitution-Making in Divided Societies 
and Legitimacy: Lessons from the South African Experience, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. 
REV. 147 (2005) (using South Africa as an example of successful participatory con-
stitution-making). 
16  Id. 
17  Samuels, supra note 9, at 664. (“It is widely acknowledged that the provision 
of security is the sine qua non of peace-building, and increasingly that the building 
or rebuilding of public institutions is key to sustainability; however, the fact re-
mains that a successful political and governance transition must form the core of 
any post-conflict peace-building mission . . ..  Constitution-making after conflict is 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018
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Because constitutional reform is an opportunity for warring par-
ties to break with the status quo and to develop new political and 
governance arrangements, warring parties have often agreed to con-
stitutional reform as a key condition of the cessation of hostilities.18  
Therefore, the promise of constitutional reform is often an effective 
peacemaking tool.  However, comprehensive participatory constitu-
tion-making processes may be impossible in countries experiencing 
ongoing hostilities and violent civil conflict.  For example, the initial 
constitution-making processes undertaken in Iraq and Afghanistan 
during the U.S. led military interventions and occupations, or in the 
creation of South Sudan were limited in their scope by the ongoing 
violent conflict and could hardly be articulated as broadly participa-
tory.  Nevertheless, these constitution-making processes were initi-
ated because they served an important role in helping to move the 
respective countries’ political transitions forward.  In the extreme 
circumstance of ongoing violent civil war with competing govern-
ments, such as in Libya and Yemen, the pursuit of constitution-mak-
ing not only frustrates consensus-building with diverse constituen-
cies, it fosters further conflict.19 
 
2.2.  Conflict Constitution-Making 
 
When constitution-making occurs during active violent civil 
conflict, many of the goals of participatory constitution-making pro-
cesses are frustrated.  Participatory constitution-making encourages 
deliberative negotiation and public participation in state creation 
and institutional design, but constitution-makers are unable to pur-
sue these goals when the security environment does not permit 
widespread public engagement.  Further, politically aligned armed 
actors can use violent civil conflict to manipulate constitution-mak-
ing processes.  Conflict constitution-making occurs when warring 
belligerents that seek to achieve political objectives through armed 
force co-opt ongoing constitution-making processes to achieve their 
political ends under the threat of force. These armed actors effec-
tively transform the constitution-making process into another site of 
                                                   
an opportunity to create a common vision of the future of a state and a road map 
on how to get there. The constitution can be partly a peace agreement and partly a 
framework setting up the rules by which the new democracy will operate.”). 
18  Id. 
19  Discussed infra in Sections 3 and 4. 
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battle.  The markers of a conflict constitution-making process are (1) 
extreme conflict amongst constitutional drafters that mirror the po-
sitions of warring belligerents, (2) an inability of drafters to reach 
consensus on these political issues, and (3) boycott and rejection of 
non-consensual constituent assembly choices by major blocs.  The 
incorporation of these conflicts into constitutional texts risks the cre-
ation of “conflict constitutions” with embedded conflicts, rather 
than embedded consensus solutions.  The danger of conflict consti-
tution-making is that it exacerbates and prolongs rather than re-
duces societal divisions. 
A conflict constitution-making process must be rehabilitated in 
order to serve as an effective tool for peace and reconciliation.  In 
states enmeshed in civil war, a cease fire or peace agreement is fre-
quently the prerequisite for a constitution-making process.20  A 
cease fire or peace agreement is intended to halt violent conflict and 
to create an environment in which warring factions can negotiate 
longer term political arrangements, including constitutional re-
form.21  The cease fire itself can provide for power distribution ar-
rangements between warring factions that ultimately are trans-
ferred into constitution-making processes.22  In order to rehabilitate 
an ongoing conflict constitution-making process, a peacemaking 
mechanism can be incorporated into the constitution-making pro-
cess.  The peacemaking mechanism should result in a peace agree-
ment that addresses the sources of conflict between warring parties 
and commits the parties to support a consensus based constitution-
making process free of violent influence.  Such an agreement creates 
space for the incorporation of consensus based solutions into the 
                                                   
20  Sujit Choudhry, Civil War, Cease Fire, Constitution: Some Preliminary Notes, 
33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1915 (2012). 
21  Christine Bell, Peace Agreements: Their Nature and Legal Status, 100 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 373, 377 (2006).  Ceasefires and peace agreements may take different forms but 
they prioritize the cessation of active hostilities and may include de-militarization 
measures such as de-armament, de-mobilization, and armed forces integration, as 
well as political measures addressing governance, elections, accountability, and in-
stitution building. Id. 
22  Choudhry, supra note 20, at 1917.  In turn, the maintenance of sustained 
peace between parties in conflict is furthered through constitution-making pro-
cesses that build long term institutions that contribute to stability. In transitional 
constitution-making, it is not unusual for the creation of a constitution to be con-
sidered part of the peace agreement – or in some instances for the constitution to be 
viewed as a de-facto peace agreement.  Cf. Hallie Ludsin, Peacemaking and Constitu-
tion-Drafting: A Dysfunctional Marriage, 33 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 239 (2011) (questioning 
whether constitution-making should also be used for peacemaking).  
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constitution and reduces the likelihood that a conflict constitution 
will be created that exacerbates societal divisions. 
Parts 3 and 4 assess the impact of violent civil war upon the con-
stitution-making processes in Libya and Yemen. 
 
3.  CIVIL WAR AND CONSTITUTION-MAKING IN LIBYA 
 
The transition governments in Libya and Yemen each initiated 
constitution-making processes before the countries devolved into 
civil war.  The declining security environment in each country pre-
vented broad-based, inclusive participatory constitution-making.  
Warring political blocs began to press for their political aims within 
constitution-making bodies.  The constitution-making processes 
themselves were inappropriate fora for much needed peacemaking, 
as they did not allow for timely political negotiation and bargaining 
among key stakeholders.23  External internationally backed peace 
negotiations became necessary to open space for meaningful consti-
tutional reform.  In Libya, a UN peace agreement facilitated the com-
pletion of a constitution backed by a new unity government.  In 
Yemen, discussed infra Section 4, the completion of a nonconsensual 
constitution fomented a new more divisive phase of the civil war. 
 
3.1.  Pre-Arab Spring Libya 
 
The civil war that followed the Arab Spring was the result of 
decades-long regional and sectarian divisions extending back to 
Libya’s formation.  Libya has historically been a federal state com-
prised of three regions—Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, and Fezzan.  Each 
region was occupied by Italy early in the twentieth century and in 
1929, Italy began to administer the entire area under one governor.24  
Following Italy’s defeat in World War II, French forces took control 
                                                   
23  Jason Gluck, Constitution-Building in a Political Vacuum: Libya and Yemen in 
2014, INT’L INST. FOR DEMOCRACY & ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE 43, 44 (2015), 
http://www.idea.int/publications/annual-review-of-cbp-2014/upload/annual-
review-of-cbp-2014-c2.pdf [https://perma.cc/996F-5GAC]. 
24  NADINE SCHNELZER, LIBYA IN THE ARAB SPRING: THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
DISCOURSE SINCE THE FALL OF GADDAFI 1, 31 (Springer VS, 2016). 
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of Fezzan, and the British occupied Cyrenaica and Tripolitania.25  In 
1951, Libya was declared independent by the United Nations.26  The 
post-independence 1951 Constitution established the United King-
dom of Libya as a hereditary monarchy with a federal, partly repre-
sentative form of government.27  In 1963, the Libyan Kingdom was 
divided into ten governorates and federal provisions were removed 
from the Constitution.28  In 1969, Qaddafi led a military coup against 
the king, took control of the country, and abolished the 1951 Consti-
tution.29  Qaddafi issued a 1969 Constitutional Proclamation that es-
tablished his Revolutionary Command Council as the supreme au-
thority in the Libyan Arab Republic.30  In 1975, Qaddafi issued the 
Green Book which provided his political philosophy for the organi-
zation of the “Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,” his 
term for the Libyan state.31  The Green Book was not a constitution, 
as it did not create state institutions nor define their authorities, nor 
define the rights of the Libyan people in relation to the state—in-
stead it laid out the philosophical underpinnings of Qaddafi’s view 
of government.32  Qaddafi manipulated historic regional and tribal 
divisions and the lack of state institutions and enforceable individ-
ual rights to maintain his authoritarian grip on power.33  The people 
                                                   
25  See Al Arabiya, Libya’s Historic Divisions Foreshadow Political Complexities in 
Post-Qaddafi Era, AL ARABIYA NEWS (Mar. 8, 2012, 1:53 PM), https://eng-
lish.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/03/08/199397.html [https://perma.cc/M2UH-
P2LV] (revisiting the history of Libya’s different regions to better understand pos-
sible political conflicts and expected separatist movements). 
26  See Country Guide: LIBYA, WASH. POST, http://www.washing-
tonpost.com/wp-srv/world/countries/libya.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2017) 
[https://perma.cc/7SW4-KMMX] (summarizing Libya’s land and people, econ-
omy, government, and history). 
27  Jorg Fedtke, Eur. Union, Comp. Analysis Between the Situations in Egypt and 
Tunis.—Lessons Learnt—Overview of the Const. Situation in Libya, 22 (Apr. 2014), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/Reg-
Data/etudes/note/join/2014/433840/EXPO-AFET_NT(2014)433840_EN.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/A3YP-WPFU]. 
28  Id. 
29  INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, THE DRAFT LIBYAN CONSTITUTION: PROCEDURAL 
DEFICIENCIES, SUBSTANTIVE FLAWS 15 (2015), https://www.icj.org/wp-content/up-
loads/2016/07/Libya-Draft-Constitution-Flaws-Deficiencies-Publications-Re-
ports-2015-ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/7TA9-FFNY]. 
30  Fedtke, supra note 27, at 22. 
31  INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, supra note 29, at 15. 
32  Id. 
33  E.g., Jackson N. Maogoto & Andrew Coleman, Changing the Guard–The Price 
of Democracy: Lessons from the Arab Spring on Constitutionalism, in THE ARAB SPRING: 
NEW PATTERNS FOR DEMOCRACY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 11-12 (Carlo Panara & 
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of Libya existed without clear constitutional rights or proper state 
institutions for the duration of Qaddafi’s 42-year regime, which 
ended with the Arab Spring Libyan revolution of 2011. 
 
3.2.  2011 Constitutional Declaration 
 
On August 3, 2011, two months before Qaddafi was killed by the 
military arm of the National Transitional Council (“NTC”)34, a lead-
ership body for the coalition of rebels, opposition activists, and ex-
patriates that had come together to militarily defeat the Qaddafi re-
gime, the NTC issued a Constitutional Declaration (“Interim 
Constitution”).35  The Interim Constitution defined the NTC and in-
terim government’s authorities during a twenty-month transition 
process that would culminate with the election of a new president 
and legislature in early 2013.  Elections for a new parliament, known 
as the General National Congress (“GNC”) were scheduled for July 
7, 2012.  Upon the GNC’s election, the NTC would dissolve and pass 
its authority to the GNC, which would then appoint the new interim 
government.36  The GNC would serve as a temporary legislative 
body until a Constitutional Drafting Assembly (“CDA”) completed 
a new constitution defining the authorities of the new parliament 
and president.37 
 
 
 
                                                   
Gary Wilson eds., 2013) (describing Qaddafi’s dismantlement of state institutions 
to consolidate his power). 
34  See S.C. Res. 1973, ¶ 4 (Mar. 17, 2011) (authorizing an international coalition 
of military forces to use military force against Qaddafi and his forces in protection 
of Libyan civilians). 
35  See THE CONSTITUTIONAL DECLARATION Aug. 3, 2011 (Libya) (declaring the 
collapse of Qaddafi’s regime). 
36  See id., art. 30 (“The Interim Transitional National Council shall be dissolved 
upon holding the first meeting of the National Public Conference.”). 
37  See id. (“The National Public Conference shall ratify and announce the re-
sults of the elections, and shall convoke the Legislative Authority for meeting 
within a period not exceeding thirty days. In the first session thereof, the National 
Public Conference shall be dissolved and the Legislative Power shall fulfill its leg-
islative tasks.”). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss2/1
  
2017] Conflict Constitution-Making 307 
3.3.  Beginnings of Constitutional Conflict – CDA Formation 
 
After Qaddafi’s defeat, fissures in the opposition coalition be-
came apparent.  Various groups began to oppose the NTC’s plans 
for constitutional reform.  Libyans from less-populous regions, mi-
nority groups, and women all expressed concern about their 
planned representation within the CDA.  Under the Interim Consti-
tution, the NTC tasked the GNC with selecting the sixty CDA mem-
bers that would draft the new Constitution.38  On the eve of the July 
2012 elections for the GNC, the NTC made a concession to the less 
populous Tripolitania and Fezzan regions whose citizens threatened 
to boycott the GNC elections out of fear that the GNC would not 
adequately represent their regions when appointing members to the 
CDA.  The NTC amended the Interim Constitution so that the CDA 
would be elected directly by voters instead of appointed by the 
GNC.39  The amendment also determined that twenty members of 
the constituent assembly would come from each of Libya’s three his-
toric regions—Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Fezzan.40  The formula 
was modeled after the sixty-member constituent assembly that cre-
ated the post-independence 1951 Libyan Constitution.41  The conces-
sion reflected one of the enduring conflicts in post-Qaddafi Libya, 
determining who would have a seat at the table for determining how 
power would be allocated in the new Libyan state. 
                                                   
38  See CONSTITUTIONAL DECLARATION amend. No. 1-2012 (Libya) (“The CDA 
shall be composed of sixty members after the model of the Committee of Sixty, 
which was established to draft the constitution of Libya’s independence in 1951”); 
see also Fedtke, supra note 27, at 22 (“The 2011 Constitutional Declaration itself, fi-
nally, sets out a basic system of government . . . but was not intended to provide 
more than the most essential transitional arrangements for a limited period of 
time.”). 
39  See CONSTITUTIONAL DECLARATION amend. No. 3-2012, art. 1 (Libya) (“Elect 
a constituent assembly of a non-GNC members by direct free vote to draft the coun-
try’s permanent constitution, to be called the Constitutional Drafting Assembly 
(CDA)”); see also CONSTITUTIONAL DECLARATION amend. No. 5-2013 (Libya) (re-
promulgating the election of the CDA by direct free ballot as the result of a court 
decision); see also INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, supra note 29, at 15 (“The requirement 
for the CDA to be elected was initially provided for by Constitutional Amendment 
No. 3, but later replaced by Constitutional Amendment No. 5 following a Supreme 
Court ruling that Constitutional Amendment 3 had not been legally promul-
gated.”). 
40  See Fedtke, supra note 27, at 20 (“Seats for the GNC were distributed nation-
ally on the basis of population numbers . . ..”). 
41  Id. 
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Following these amendments to the Interim Constitution, the 
GNC was elected in July 2012.  The GNC contained sixty members 
from Cyrenaica in Eastern Libya, 100 members from Tripolitania in 
Western Libya, and forty members from Fezzan in southern Libya.42  
This representation mirrored the population of the country:30% in 
Cyrenaica, 60% in Tripolitania, and 10% in Fezzan.43 
Another conflict surrounding CDA formation concerned the 
scope of minority and female representation in the CDA.  The 
Amazigh, Touareg, and Tebu minority groups expressed concern 
that they would not obtain adequate representation within the 
CDA.44  The Amazigh had been among the groups that were early 
opponents of Qaddafi because Qaddafi’s brand of Arab nationalism 
had long oppressed their cultural and linguistic expression.45  The 
minority groups wanted to ensure that they had consequential vot-
ing power within the CDA and thus pushed for a voting framework 
that required that any decision involving minority rights must have 
their agreement.46  Similar concerns were expressed about the scope 
of female representation.  The head of the GNC Human Rights Com-
mittee noted that the committee advocated for a 35% representation 
of women in the CDA.47  A 2013 law enacted by the GNC reserved 
10% of the CDA seats (six) for women and two seats each for the 
Amazigh, Touareg, and Tebu.48  The Amazigh, who consisted of 
nearly 10% of the Libyan population, were dissatisfied with the two 
seats that they were allocated.49  They were also dissatisfied with the 
                                                   
42  See id. (“The TNC was dissolved with the election of the General National 
Congress on 7 July 2012 . . . [giving] districts in Tripolitania (western Libya) 100 
seats, districts in Cyrenaica (eastern Libya) 60 seats, and districts in Fezzan (south-
ern Libya) 40 seats.”). 
43  See id. (“The three parts of the country account for roughly 60, 30, and 10 
percent of the population respectively.”) 
44  See INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, supra note 29, at 16 (detailing the controversy 
arising over sufficient representation of minorities). 
45  The Amazigh are also known as the Berbers. 
46  Fedtke, supra note 27, at 21. 
47  INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, supra note 29, at 16. 
48  See Law Number 7 of 2013 (Libya); see also Fedtke, supra note 27, at 20 (de-
scribing how the law attempted to secure representation of women and ethnic 
groups). 
49  See Ronald Bruce St. John, Libya’s Draft Constitution: Compromise or Compro-
mised?, ATLANTIC COUNCIL (Mar. 3, 2016), http://www.atlantic-
council.org/blogs/menasource/libya-s-draft-constitution-compromise-or-com-
promised [https://perma.cc/FB85-MTDK] (discussing how based on proportional 
representation the Amazigh should have been allocated six seats). 
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voting framework adopted for the CDA, which was a two-thirds 
plus one majority—a framework which would require coordination 
across regions but which could still result in minority groups being 
overruled on issues.50  The Amazigh found the GNC’s attempt to 
ameliorate their concerns by (1) naming the minority groups “cul-
tural and linguistic” components of Libyan society, and (2) alluding 
that CDA members should reach an agreement with minorities on 
the issues of concern, to be unsatisfactory.51  Ultimately, the 
Amazigh boycotted the CDA election and its work.52  The Touareg 
and Tebu minorities, which received two seats each, soon followed 
the Amazigh into a boycott of the body.  The boycott arose out of 
minority group members’ belief that the CDA was not operating in 
a consensus-based manner, as called for by the Constitutional Dec-
laration.53 
The CDA was elected by national referendum in February 
2014.54  Six hundred forty-nine candidates ran for the CDA, includ-
ing sixty-five women.55  Two rounds of voting were held on Febru-
ary 20 and February 26 because of violence at eighty polling stations 
on the first day of voting.56  Ongoing violence prevented successive 
polling at several stations, resulting in thirteen seats on the CDA re-
maining unfilled initially.57  Although the Amazigh, Touareg, and 
Tebu minorities initially boycotted the CDA, two months after the 
CDA began its work, the Touareg and Tebu representatives joined 
the assembly.58  Ultimately all but four seats on the CDA were filled.  
The unfilled seats belonged to the boycotting Amazigh community 
                                                   
50  Gluck, supra note 23, at 46.   
51  See CONSTITUTIONAL DECLARATION amend. No. 7-2014, art. 1 (Libya) (“taking 
into account the distinct linguistic and cultural components of Libyan society 
(Amazigh—Tuareg—Tubu)”); see also INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, supra note 29, at 16 
(describing how the Amazigh still decided to boycott the elections and constitu-
tional drafting process even after the GNC adopted Constitutional Amendment No. 
7). 
52  See INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, supra note 29, at 16 (commenting how the 
Amazigh boycotted the elections and continued to boycott the constitutional draft-
ing). 
53  See St. John, supra note 49 (detailing the boycott after the GNC ignored de-
mands for official recognition of Amazigh language, cultural identity, and contri-
bution to Libyan history). 
54  Fedtke, supra note 27, at 20-21. 
55  INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, supra note 29, at 16. 
56  Id. 
57  Id. 
58  Id. 
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and representatives of the Derna community, unable to attend the 
CDA due to ongoing violence.59 
The CDA produced its first draft proposals in December 2014 
and its first draft constitution in October 2015.60  A revised draft was 
released in February 2016 and a final draft was adopted in April 
2016. 
 
3.4.  Civil Conflict 
 
Two months after the CDA held its first meeting in April 2014, 
parliamentary elections were held.  Two-thousand candidates com-
peted for seats in Libya’s new House of Representatives.61  On June 
26, 2014, about 630,000 people, less than half of the 1.5 million Liby-
ans who had registered to vote, showed up at the polls.62  This num-
ber was a fraction of the 2.8 million Libyans who had registered to 
vote for the GNC in 2012.63  The low voter turnout was caused by 
ongoing violence between government security forces and militias 
that had broken out after Qaddafi’s removal, and the fracturing of 
some members of the opposition coalition that had joined forces to 
topple him.  Five people were killed in the fighting that broke out 
between Islamist militias and government security forces in Ben-
ghazi.64  Human rights activist, lawyer, and former NTC member 
Salwa Bughaighis was shot dead at her home in Benghazi shortly 
after returning from voting.65  Benghazi became a flashpoint for 
fighting between Islamist militias and the government, as dramati-
cally demonstrated by the death of U.S. Ambassador Chris Stevens 
during a militia attack on a U.S. compound in Benghazi on Septem-
ber 11, 2012. 
The elections for the House of Representatives were called by 
the transition government out of fear that Libyan National Army 
                                                   
59  Id. 
60  Id. at 4 (providing a timeline of the constitutional drafting process).  
61  Libyan Elections: Low Turnout Marks Bid to End Political Crisis, BBC NEWS 
(June 26, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-28005801 
[https://perma.cc/H66K-VRNJ]. 
62  Id.  
63  Id. 
64  Id.  
65  Id.  
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss2/1
  
2017] Conflict Constitution-Making 311 
General Khalifah Haftar was plotting a coup.66  Haftar denied the 
allegations, but still embarked on a military campaign called “Oper-
ation Dignity” against Islamist militias that he believed were hold-
ing Libya hostage to violence.67  The Islamist coalition that he fought 
included Ansar al-Sharia, the group accused of killing Ambassador 
Stevens.68  The government and militia fighting led to seventy 
deaths and the storming of the GNC by armed men.69  The House of 
Representatives elections were held in the midst of the escalating 
violence.70 
Liberal and nationalist politicians won the majority of seats in 
the House of Representatives, as they had two years earlier during 
the GNC elections.  Islamist politicians were bitterly defeated.71  Vi-
olent clashes broke out between the Islamist militias, calling them-
selves the Libya Dawn coalition, and General Haftar’s Operation 
Dignity government forces at the Tripoli International Airport.72  
The fighting destroyed the airport and the Libya Dawn militias took 
control of Tripoli.  Libya Dawn then conducted a coup d’état in Trip-
oli in support of the Islamist parties that had lost the elections.73  The 
elected House of Representatives, Prime Minister Adbullah al-
Thinni, and his cabinet all fled east to the cities of Tobruk and 
Beidi.74  They are backed by General Haftar’s Operation Dignity 
forces.75  The Tobruk-based government was recognized by the Eu-
ropean Union, United States, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates.76  
The Libya Dawn Coalition took over Tripoli and appointed its own 
                                                   
66  Id.  
67  Id.  
68  Rebecca Murray, Libya: A Tale of Two Governments, AL JAZEERA (Apr. 4, 2015), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/04/libya-tale-governments-
150404075631141.html [https://perma.cc/KNZ4-4Y5N]. 
69  BBC NEWS, supra note 61. 
70  Id. 
71  Murray, supra note 68. 
72  Id. 
73  Justin Salhani, The Forgotten Conflict in Libya, Explained, THINK PROGRESS 
(Feb. 25, 2016), https://thinkprogress.org/the-forgotten-conflict-in-libya-ex-
plained-4ffc134b0a9a#.z2nh7pqvl [https://perma.cc/E5VM-HL6G]. 
74  Id. 
75  Murray, supra note 68. 
76  Id.  
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018
  
312 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 39:2 
government, reinstating a new GNC as its legislature and appoint-
ing a Tripoli-based government, initially headed by Prime Minister 
Omar al-Hassi.77 
Since June 2014, Libya has had dueling governments in Tripoli 
and Tobruk, and the country has fallen further into political and se-
curity chaos.  The political and security vacuum created space for 
ISIS to infiltrate Libya and to engage in violent fighting with both 
governments.78  The war has left five thousand dead, half a million 
Libyans homeless, ruined the Libyan economy, and caused diplo-
mats, foreign investors, and countless Libyans themselves to leave 
the country.79 
 
3.5.  United Nations-Brokered Peace Deal 
 
United Nations-brokered peace talks first began in September 
2014.  On December 17, 2015, representatives from both Libyan gov-
ernments signed a UN-brokered peace deal in Morocco that called 
for the creation of a unity government and for forces supporting the 
rival governments to cease hostilities.80  The agreement created a 
Government of National Accord run by a Presidency Council as the 
unified governing executive authority in Libya, and gave it respon-
sibility for organizing the next phase of Libya’s political transition.81  
In signing the peace deal, the separate governments agreed to cede 
authority to this body and to encourage their militia forces to do so 
as well.  The agreement also called for the shoring up of the national 
army and police force under the new government.  The objective of 
the peace deal was that a unified government, with the backing of 
the international community, would be able to politically stabilize 
the country and initiate joint operations against ISIS.  Under the 
                                                   
77  Id.  
78  Id.  
79  Chris Stephen, Five Years After Gaddafi, Libya Torn by Civil War and Battles 
with ISIS, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 16, 2016), http://www.theguard-
ian.com/world/2016/feb/16/libya-gaddafi-arab-spring-civil-war-islamic-state 
[https://perma.cc/SY5G-CWSA]. 
80  Rival Libyan Factions Sign UN-backed Peace Deal, AL JAZEERA (Dec. 17, 2015), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/12/libya-rival-parliaments-sign-backed-
deal-151217131709056.html [https://perma.cc/8H5P-5D6K]. 
81  LIBYAN POL. AGREEMENT art. 1.3 (Dec 17, 2015), https://unsmil.unmis-
sions.org/sites/default/files/Libyan%20Political%20Agreement%20-
%20ENG%20.pdf [https://perma.cc/GU8E-FXT3]. 
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peace agreement, the Government of National Accord was empow-
ered to exercise executive authority in Libya for up to two years, or 
until a new Libyan Constitution was finalized and a new executive 
authority was instituted pursuant to that Constitution.82 
The peace agreement prioritized the completion of a constitution 
as a key element of the transition.  The peace deal also provided that 
the parties would agree to respect the independence and impartial-
ity of the CDA, and that the unity government would guarantee the 
security of the Assembly, and create an environment that would en-
able it to work independently and have unhindered access and com-
munication with all sectors of Libyan society.83  The peace agree-
ment gave both support and direction to the CDA.  The agreement 
stated that the unity government would provide the necessary fi-
nancial and logistical support for the CDA to complete its work.84  It 
also directed the CDA to provide a roadmap with a timeline for the 
completion of its work, to involve all cultural communities in its 
work, and to complete its work by March 24, 2016, within three 
months of the completion of the brokered agreement.85  If the CDA 
did not complete its work within that three month period, responsi-
bility for constitutional reform would revert to a committee of five 
representatives, each from the House of Representatives and the 
State Council (the former GNC, acting as a consultative body), with 
the participation of the Presidency Council.86 
 
3.6.  The CDA Conflict Zone 
 
The CDA ultimately met the deadline called for by the National 
Accord agreement by releasing a draft constitution in February 2016; 
however, that result was threatened by significant conflict through-
out the CDA’s term.87  The CDA electoral rules required that elected 
members receive a simple majority rather than an absolute majority 
                                                   
82  Id. at art. 1.4.  
83  Id. at art. 48. 
84  Id. at art. 49. 
85  Id. at arts. 50, 52. 
86  Id. at art. 52. 
87  DRAFT LIBYAN CONST. (2016), http://www.constitutionnet.org/sites/de-
fault/files/draft_constitution_of_libya_april_2016_unofficial_english_trasla-
tion.pdf [https://perma.cc/MZE2-LKVC]. 
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of all those voting.88  As a consequence, only ten of the fifty-one 
members initially elected to the CDA received more than fifty per-
cent in their respective electoral districts, and nine of the members 
were elected with less than twenty-five percent of the vote in their 
respective districts.89  The fact that a majority of CDA members rep-
resented a minority of their districts increased the potential for frac-
tious disputes and deadlock within the body.90  The CDA members 
were also deeply divided by the competing agendas of Libya’s three 
historic regions.  The representatives battled over issues such as the 
system of government, national identity, the role of religion, the dis-
tribution of resources, federalism vs. decentralization, and the loca-
tion of the capital and sovereign institutions.91  The civil war and 
external pressure from the competing governments in Tobruk and 
Tripoli, their political backers, and the broader government, in-
creased the tensions and conflict within the CDA over these issues.92 
Libya’s political factions attempted to draw the CDA into their 
disputes from its inception.  The CDA resisted calls by the Libyan 
National Army under General Haftar to take over legislative control 
from the GNC in May 2014 (one month prior to the election of the 
HOR), or calls from the Supreme Council of the Judiciary to help 
                                                   
88  Dirk Vandewalle & Nicholas Jahr, Libya’s Unexpected Strength, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 8, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/09/opinion/libyas-unex-
pected-strength.html [https://perma.cc/P5N5-KDSS]. 
89  Id. 
90  Id. 
91  See In Depth: Over a Year Late Libya Struggles to Finish Constitution, LIBYA 
CHANNEL (Feb. 9, 2016), https://web.ar-
chive.org/web/20161109074013/http://en.libyaschannel.com/2016/02/09/in-
depth-over-a-year-late-libya-struggles-to-finish-constitution 
[https://perma.cc/7ESX-ZXU9] (describing variety of the issues in contention 
within the CDA); see also, Omar Ould Dedde O. Hammady & Michael Meyer-
Resende, Saving Libya’s Constitution-Making Body, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L 
PEACE (Dec. 18, 2014), http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/?fa=57565 
[https://perma.cc/K7JR-SLFT] (“After all, it is the democratically elected body 
tasked to find constitutional solutions to Libya’s major problems, including the 
management of oil resources, decentralization, minority rights, the role of religion, 
and the system of government.”). 
92 See LIBYA CHANNEL, supra note 91 (stating that increasing tensions have man-
ifested in the form of resignations and delayed results); see also, Hammady, supra 
note 91 (stating that competing claims of legitimacy by two governments raises the 
tension for the CDA). 
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mediate political disputes between General Haftar and the GNC.93  
The CDA resisted both calls saying that it was an independent body 
which exclusively had the limited mandate of constitutional re-
form.94  Nonetheless, political issues influenced and divided the 
body from within.  In the committee’s early work, members staked 
out maximalist positions and battled over preferred positions on a 
number of issues.95  The committee publicly released a series of arti-
cles on key issues rather than a promised first draft in December 
2014.96  The assembly was unable to reach agreement on issues such 
as the structure of the state and the scope of decentralization—key 
issues in dispute between the two competing governments in To-
bruk and Tripoli, and their militia backers who had become engaged 
in protracted and intense armed conflict.97 
 
3.7.  Strategic Withdrawal 
 
The CDA members battled over process as well as substance, 
and numerous boycotts and withdrawals by CDA members under-
mined consensus on the constitutional text.  Unlike the Amazigh 
who never joined the assembly, the Tebu and Touraeg took their re-
served seats in the assembly in June 2014, two months after the CDA 
began its work.98  However, they later boycotted the assembly again 
over the assembly’s procedures established to resolve contentious 
issues.99  In June 2015, Ali Tarhouni, the assembly president, formed 
a 12-member working group to resolve outstanding issues that the 
                                                   
93  Suliman Ibrahim, Will Libya’s Constitutional Drafting Assembly Survive the 
Turbulent Times?, IDEA (June 6, 2014), http://www.constitution-
net.org/news/will-libyas-constitutional-drafting-assembly-survive-turbulent-
times [https://perma.cc/8KM8-8TXP]. 
94  Id. (recounting that the CDA was not given a governance mandate). 
95  Michael Meyer-Resende & Omar O. Hammady, These 56 People Have a 
Chance to Save Libya, FOREIGN POLICY (Apr. 21, 2015), https://foreignpol-
icy.com/2015/04/21/these-56-people-have-a-chance-to-save-libya 
[https://perma.cc/29HU-CA2N] (describing the CDA’s disagreement over a num-
ber of issues at the heart of Libya’s political struggles). 
96  Gluck, supra note 23, at 48 (addressing the important constitutional ques-
tions but failing to address the most contentious).  
97  Id. 
98  INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, supra note 29, at 16. 
99  Id. at 17.   
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CDA had been unable to reconcile in a final draft text.100  The Tebu 
and Touraeg objected to the fact that the working group was slated 
to have only one member to represent the views of both minority 
groups.101  Both groups found the suggestion that both groups’ 
views were interchangeable to be patronizing, and they promised to 
never accept any document that came out of the working group.102  
They resigned the commission on August 19, 2015 and asked the in-
ternational community to put pressure on the assembly to respect 
its prior commitments to reach agreement with minority groups on 
any final text.103 
The tensions over Tarhuni’s leadership and his formation of the 
Working Group grew so great that in November 2015, a number of 
assembly members demanded that Tarhouni resign from his posi-
tion.104  Tarhouni remained but the attrition from the CDA contin-
ued.  On January 18, 2016, two members of the Working Group from 
Western Libya resigned over what they described as the “federalist 
inclinations” of the working group.105  Ten days later on January 28, 
eleven members of the CDA resigned, complaining that the Work-
ing Group was dividing Libya with “regional quotas.”106  On Janu-
ary 30, 2016, the Amazigh community, along with the boycotting 
Tebu and Touraeg CDA members, declared that they would not ac-
cept any constitution not agreed upon by the minority communi-
ties.107  The increasing conflict within the body threatened the com-
pletion of the CDA’s work, and Tarhouni rushed to complete a 
second draft, announcing its release on February 3, 2016.108  Two 
weeks later, an appeals court ruled on a complaint filed by a CDA 
member in January and determined that CDA President Tarhouni 
                                                   
100  LIBYA CHANNEL, supra note 91. 
101  Mustafa Khalifa, Tuareg and Tebus Threaten to Walk Out of the Constitution 
Drafting Assembly, MARSAD (Jun. 28, 2015), http://www.mar-
sad.ly/en/2015/06/28/tuareg-and-tebus-threaten-to-walk-out-of-constitution-
drafting-assembly [https://perma.cc/CB8C-CA59]. 
102  Id. 
103  Mustafa Khalifa, Tebus and Tuareg Members Walk Out of Constitution Drafting 
Assembly, MARSAD (Aug. 20, 2015), http://www.marsad.ly/en/2015/08/20/tebus-
and-tuareg-members-walk-out-of-constitution-drafting-assembly 
[https://perma.cc/6ZQF-ZYJV]. 
104  LIBYA CHANNEL, supra note 91. 
105  Id. 
106  Id.  
107  Id. 
108  Id. 
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would have to leave his position in the CDA because of his dual 
American citizenship.109  CDA members pledged to continue their 
work to produce a final draft constitution by March 24, irrespective 
of Tarhouni’s status.110 
Further conflict erupted within the CDA when 32 members ac-
cepted an offer by the Sultanate of Oman, under the auspices of the 
UN, to host international consultations in Oman with foreign legal 
advisers on the draft text.111  The UN took a particular interest in 
facilitating completion of the constitution because the peace agree-
ment that it had brokered between Libya’s competing governments 
had called for the completion of the constitution, as a key out-
come.112  Nonetheless, nine constituent assembly members viewed 
the sessions as inappropriate foreign interference and, conse-
quently, boycotted the CDA.113  On April 23, 2016, the CDA an-
nounced that it adopted the amended text of the Working Group 
after its consultations in Oman, and that it would forward the doc-
ument to Libyan authorities for next steps, including a public refer-
endum.114  This announcement was made notwithstanding the fact 
that nearly half the CDA had not participated in the Oman sessions 
and that the Amizigh, Tabu, and Touraeg communities continued in 
their objections to the final text of the draft constitution.115  The sta-
tus of the draft constitution was thrown into further doubt when an 
Appeals Court purported to annul the draft constitution, because it 
was not adopted by a quorum under the CDA’s original procedural 
                                                   
109  Libya in Flux as Constitution and Unity Government Face Yet More Delays, 
LIBYA CHANNEL (Feb. 18, 2016),  
http://web.archive.org/web/20160429225551/http://en.libyaschan-
nel.com/2016/02/18/libya-in-flux-as-constitution-and-unity-government-face-
yet-more-delays [https://perma.cc/GQ2X-3QWT]. 
110  Id. 
111  In Depth: Libya’s Constituent Assembly Divided Over Oman Sessions, LIBYA 
CHANNEL (Mar. 22, 2016),  
http://web.archive.org/web/20170330072731/http://en.libyaschan-
nel.com/2016/03/22/in-depth-libyas-constituent-assembly-divided-over-oman-
sessions [https://perma.cc/339K-VNG8]. 
112  LIBYAN POL. AGREEMENT, supra note 81, arts. 47–52. 
113  In Depth: Libya’s Constituent Assembly Divided Over Oman Sessions, supra 
note 111. 
114  CDA: Constitution Draft Is Ready, A Poll Is to Follow, LIBYAN EXPRESS (Apr. 
23, 2016), http://www.libyanexpress.com/cda-constitution-draft-is-ready-a-poll-
is-to-follow [https://perma.cc/E2ZK-RFW8]. 
115  Id. 
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rules.116  Despite the appellate court ruling and boycotting CDA 
members’ opposition, the United Nations continued to view the 
draft constitution as legitimate and encouraged the House of Repre-
sentatives to put the draft to a public referendum as soon as possible 
to meet the strictures of the December 2015 National Accord Agree-
ment, which called for the transition of power from the temporary 
unity government to a permanent executive authority elected pur-
suant to a new constitution.117  At the time of writing, the status of 
the adoption of the draft constitution remains as uncertain as the 
question of whether the provisions of the constitution, adopted in 
the midst of significant conflict in the CDA, will foment or amelio-
rate divisions in Libya society.  The draft text is analyzed infra Sec-
tion 4. 
 
3.8.  Leveraging the Peace Deal 
 
In the midst of a violent civil war, the CDA completed a draft 
constitution but its ability to engage in widespread participatory 
constitution-making was significantly impeded by the ongoing vio-
lence.118  The civil war led various ethnic, political, and tribal group 
factions to contest one another over issues that were constitutional 
in nature, such as the form of government, federalism, security ar-
rangements, and the role of religion.119  Further, in the midst of civil 
war, the CDA was unable to carry out national consultations about 
the constitution-drafting process and did not have sufficient inter-
action with the political elites in Tripoli and Tobruk to confirm that 
the opposing governments would recognize the new constitution.120 
                                                   
116 Abdulkader Assad, Al-Bayda Appeals Court Annuls the Constitution Draft, 
LIBYA OBSERVER (May 9, 2016), http://www.libyaobserver.ly/news/al-bayda-ap-
peals-court-annuls-constitution-draft [https://perma.cc/6RJ4-FD8A]. 
117  Article 1(4) of the National Accord Agreement called for the transition of 
power from the unity government to an executive authority elected pursuant to the 
new constitution, prior to or at the expiration of the unity government’s one-year 
term.  The unity government may be continued for an additional year if the consti-
tution is not completed during its first year.  This provision appeared to give the 
CDA until the end of 2016, or the end of 2017 at the outer limit, to pass the consti-
tution by national referendum.  LIBYAN POL. AGREEMENT, supra note 81, art. 1.4. 
118  INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, supra note 29, at 18–21. 
119  Gluck, supra note 23, at 47. 
120  Id. at 48. 
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The constitution-making process in Libya exhibited the classic 
markers of conflict constitution-making:  extreme conflicts between 
drafters mirrored tensions between the Libyan-Dawn backed Islam-
ist government in Tripoli and the Operation-Dignity backed nation-
alist government in Tobruk over local representation and central au-
thority, and the Amazigh, Touraeg and Tebu minority groups 
boycotted the assembly and rejected non-consensus constituent as-
sembly solutions regarding minority rights.121  The UN-brokered 
peace agreement helped to ameliorate one of the markers of conflict 
constitution-making—a lack of consensus over divisive issues.  The 
UN peace agreement committed the governments in Tripoli and To-
bruk to support the consensus solutions adopted by the CDC across 
a range of divisive issues.  The peace deal opened up political space 
that kept the constitutional reform process on track. The peace deal 
detailed the conditions for the formation of a unity government and 
committed the unity government to support the work of the CDA 
financially and logistically, and to provide for its security.  Although 
the peace deal did not resolve nor prevent all of the CDA’s internal 
conflicts, it enabled constitutional reform to move forward and com-
mitted the competing governments to support the work of the body.  
It remains to be seen whether the Libyan people will support the 
draft constitution produced by the CDA when it is put forward for 
a public referendum.  I recommend measures to shore up public 
support for the text infra Part 7. 
 
4.  CONSTITUTION-MAKING IN YEMEN 
 
Just as in Libya, Yemen’s constitution-drafting process unfolded 
against the backdrop of an expanding civil war.  Constitution-mak-
ers were pressured by the competing interests of multiple constitu-
encies and were unable to achieve consensus on core issues involv-
ing the structure of the state.  The divisions in Yemen date back to 
the formation of the country. 
 
                                                   
121  As discussed in Section 2, the markers of a conflict constitution-making 
process are (1) extreme conflict amongst constitutional drafters that mirror the po-
sitions of warring belligerents, (2) an inability of drafters to reach consensus on 
these political issues, and (3) boycott and rejection of non-consensual constituent 
assembly choices by major blocs. 
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4.1.  Pre-Arab Spring Yemen 
 
Yemen, the poorest state in the Middle East, has, in many ways, 
been two states for much of its modern history.  In 1904, the Ottoman 
Empire and the British agreed on a demarcation line delineating 
their control over the territory of Yemen.122  The demarcation line 
created an Ottoman North and a British South in Yemen.  When the 
Ottoman Empire fell at the end of WWI, the northern part of the 
country became an independent kingdom run by a Zaidi imam.123  
In 1962, Arab Nationalists toppled the ruling imam and founded a 
republic with Egypt’s assistance, but the new government fell into a 
ten-year civil war with former royal regime loyalists backed by 
Saudi Arabia.124  Southern Yemen remained a British protectorate 
until 1967, when insurgents forced the British out.125  Marxists took 
over the government in 1970, and the People’s Democratic Republic 
of Yemen was formed with the support of the Soviet Union and com-
munist states.126  Twenty years later, North and South Yemen 
formed a united republic, ruled by the former North Yemeni Presi-
dent Ali Abdullah Saleh.127  Southern leaders attempted to declare a 
separate state in 1994 because of disputes over power-sharing.  Saleh 
led a military campaign that quashed the rebellion in the South.128  
Over the next two decades, Saleh continued to build his political 
power, but did not address the rampant poverty, corruption and 
weak rule of law in the country, which enabled Al Qaeda to infil-
trate.129  In 2000, Al Qaeda bombed the USS Cole off the coast of 
Aden.  The United States has engaged in drone attacks and covert 
CIA operations against Al Qaeda in Yemen on an ongoing basis 
since 2009.130  The country is still largely divided along tribal lines 
                                                   
122  Ishaan Tharoor, A Brief History of Yemen: Rich Past, Impoverished Present, 
TIME (Nov. 1, 2010), http://content.time.com/time/world/arti-
cle/0,8599,2028740,00.html [https://perma.cc/XG4V-7478]. 
123  Id. 
124  Id. 
125  Id. 
126  Id. 
127  Id. 
128  Id. 
129  Id. 
130  The first US drone strike against terrorist individuals in Yemen occurred 
in 2002.  The drone attacks were resumed under President Obama in 2009.  To date 
there have been 172 drone strikes in Yemen that have killed over 1,100 people.  
Drone Strikes: Yemen, NEW AMERICA, https://www.newamerica.org/in-
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and it has continually faced separatist movements, including one 
from the Iranian-backed Shiite Zaidi Houthis. 
 
4.2.  Arab Spring Protests in Yemen 
 
In early 2011, the wave of Arab Spring protests that began in Tu-
nisia and spread through the Middle East and North Africa region 
reached Yemen.  Unemployed Yemeni youth and political activists 
were joined by opposition parties and some members of the govern-
ment in protest of the Saleh government.  The protesters demanded 
an end to pervasive corruption, better economic opportunities, po-
litical reform and the protection of human rights.131  The ten month 
conflict between the protesters and the government resulted in 250 
deaths, 1,000 injuries, and 100,000 displaced people.132  Government 
defections, armed violence, and potential economic collapse caused 
Saleh to step down from his presidency in November 2011 under a 
deal brokered by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)133 and sup-
ported by the United States.134  Under the terms of the deal, Saleh 
ceded power to his Vice President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi until 
elections could be held three months later in February 2012.135  The 
GCC deal called for the formation of a transitional unity government 
under Hadi, composed of members from Saleh’s party and from op-
position stakeholders, and granted Saleh and his family immunity 
from prosecution for human rights violations that occurred during 
                                                   
depth/americas-counterterrorism-wars/us-targeted-killing-program-yemen/ 
[https://perma.cc/ZVA8-DJX2]. 
131  Alma Abdul Hadi Jadallah, Conflict Assessment of the Republic of Yemen, SCH. 
FOR CONFLICT ANALYSIS & RESOL. (2015), http://activity.scar.gmu.edu/sites/de-
fault/files/Yemen_CDA_Final_July.13.2015-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/77XB-
RW4D]. 
132  Id. 
133  The GCC is a regional, intergovernmental economic and political union 
whose members include all of the Arab states on the Persian Gulf, i.e., UAE, Qatar, 
Oman, Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, except Iraq. 
134  Jadallah, supra note 131, at 11. 
135  Agreement on the Implementation Mechanism for the Transition Process 
in Yemen in Accordance with the Initiative of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 
Dec. 5, 2011, https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peace-
maker.un.org/files/YE_111205_Agreement%20on%20the%20implementation%20
mechanism%20for%20the%20transition.pdf [https://perma.cc/K58T-URP8] 
[hereinafter GCC Agreement]. 
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his presidency and against protesters during the 2011 uprising.136  
Saleh went into exile and Hadi was elected President of Yemen in 
an uncontested election held in February 2012.137 
 
4.3.  The Seeds of Civil and Constitutional Conflict—National 
Dialogue 
 
The 2011 GCC-brokered transition agreement also called for a 
National Dialogue consisting of stakeholders from diverse political 
parties and civil society to monitor the agreement and to develop 
recommendations for the interim government on the transition.138  
The first National Dialogue Conference (NDC) was held in March 
2013 and 565 delegates focused on issues critical to the political tran-
sition, including the threat of secession in the South, armed rebellion 
in the North, national reconciliation and redress for human rights 
abuses, security sector reform, and the drafting of a new constitu-
tion.139  The National Dialogue completed its work on January 24, 
2014 and issued a comprehensive report with nearly 1,800 recom-
mendations.140  Key political organization recommendations in-
cluded that Hadi’s presidency should be extended for another year, 
parliament should include equal representation between the North 
and the South, and that Yemen should become a six region federa-
tion, with four regions in the north, two regions in the South, and an 
independent capital city—Sanaa.141  While the international commu-
nity was generally laudatory about the NDC outcome document, 
certain Yemeni groups were critical of the result, including the Zaidi 
Shiite (Houthi) Movement, and the Southern Hiraak Movement, 
which each expressed concern that the six region federation would 
subsume the autonomy of their territory in the South.142  Much of 
                                                   
136  Id. 
137  Jadallah, supra note 131, at 11. 
138  GCC Agreement, supra note 135, at para. 20. 
139  ERICA GASTON, U.S. INST. OF PEACE, PROCESS LESSONS LEARNED IN YEMEN’S 
NATIONAL DIALOGUE 3 (Feb. 2014), https://www.usip.org/sites/de-
fault/files/SR342_Process-Lessons-Learned-in-Yemens-National-Dialogue.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7FVT-89W2]. 
140  Id. at 4. 
141  Jadallah, supra note 131, at 12. 
142  Id. at 14. 
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the leadership of the Southern secessionist Hiraak Movement re-
fused to participate in the NDC and those that did participate fa-
vored a two region federation and a referendum on outright seces-
sion from the North in three years.143  The Houthis, the armed militia 
of the Zaidi Shiite sect, also preferred a two region split.144  While 
the NDC agreed that the state would be comprised of a federal struc-
ture, the specific proposal for a six region federation was tabled and 
excluded from the NDC’s Outcome Document due to opposition 
from southern delegates.145  Two weeks after the NDC concluded its 
work, President Hadi appointed an unrepresentative special com-
mittee that adopted the six region federation that southern delegates 
had rejected during the NDC.146  The National Dialogue’s inability 
to achieve a consensus solution regarding the structure of the state 
sowed the seeds of the ensuing civil and constitutional conflict that 
Yemen faced. 
 
4.4.  Conflict Over the Formation of the Constitutional Drafting 
Committee 
 
The GCC-brokered Transition Plan and the NDC Outcome Doc-
ument called for the creation of a thirty-member constituent assem-
bly to draft a new constitution.147  The membership of the constitu-
ent assembly was to mirror the NDC’s political, regional, and civil 
                                                   
143  Id.; INT’L CRISIS GRP., YEMEN’S SOUTHERN QUESTION: AVOIDING A BREAKDOWN 
(Sept. 25, 2013), https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/yemen-s-southern-ques-
tion-avoiding-a-breakdown.pdf [https://perma.cc/3AGY-PR25].  See also Gluck, 
supra note 23, at 50 (listing Hiraak’s refusal to participate as one of the reasons why 
the NDC could not come to an agreement). 
144  Yemen’s Houthis Reject Draft Constitution, PROJECT ON MIDDLE EAST 
DEMOCRACY, http://pomed.org/blog-post/political-process/political-transi-
tion/yemens-houthis-reject-draft-constitution [https://perma.cc/R4HR-JX5N]. 
145  See GASTON, supra note 139, at 3-4 (noting that the compromise agreement 
on Yemen’s future as federal state did not settle the issue of the number of subna-
tional regions). 
146  Id. at 4. 
147  GCC Agreement, supra note 133, at para. 22; see also Ashraf Al-Falahi, 
Yemen’s Fraught Constitution Drafting Committee, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L 
PEACE (May 2, 2014), http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/?fa=55496 
[https://perma.cc/E89R-8N3F] (“In his announcement, Hadi specified that the 
CDC would have seventeen members; this contradicts the agreement reached by 
the nation-building team at the National Dialogue Conference, which recom-
mended that the CDC be comprised of 30 members selected according to their area 
of expertise.”). 
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society representation.148  On March 8, 2014, President Hadi ap-
pointed a seventeen-member Constitutional Drafting Committee 
(CDC).  The CDC lacked the full representation of the NDC stake-
holders called for in the GCC and NDC plans.149  Several groups, 
including the Socialist party, youth groups, and the southern seces-
sionists, expressed concern about their lack of representation in the 
CDC and the representatives’ lack of expertise about constitutional 
matters or federalism.150  Concern about how the CDC would ap-
proach the creation of a federal state within the constitution was a 
significant concern for numerous stakeholders, as the NDC decision 
to create a federal state had been contentious.151 
 
4.5.  Civil War Erupts and the Peace and National Partnership 
Agreement Fails 
 
The CDC was given only one year to complete a momentous 
task—incorporating many of the NDC’s 1,800 outcomes into a con-
stitution.  Its work was frustrated by political conflict within the 
body as well as civil conflict in Sanaa where it was based.  In August 
2014, Houthi rebels, who had long been opponents of President 
Saleh’s regime, attacked Yemeni forces and took near control of 
Yemen’s capital, Sanaa.152  The Houthi attacks bolstered calls by 
Southern separatist groups for independence, and further threat-
ened the viability of the CDC’s incorporation of the NDC’s pro-
posals regarding the division of political power into a new constitu-
tion.153  Armed Houthis took control of several government 
ministries in Sanaa in September 2014 following protests that de-
manded the formation of a new government and the restoration of 
fuel subsidies.154  The UN mediated discussions between Hadi’s 
                                                   
148  GCC Agreement, supra note 135, at para. 20. 
149  Al-Falahi, supra note 147.  
150  Id.  
151  See id. (noting the “fragile unity” of the Yemini population in the state 
building process). 
152  Gluck, supra note 23, at 52. 
153  Id. 
154  Arafat Madabish, Yemen: Uncertainty Over New Constitution Continues Fol-
lowing Kidnapping, ASHARQ AL-AWSAT (Jan. 18, 2015), https://eng-ar-
chive.aawsat.com/arafat-madabish/news-middle-east/yemen-uncertainty-over-
new-constitution-continues-following-kidnapping [https://perma.cc/6ZHU-
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transition government, the Houthis, and Southern leaders through-
out late 2014, but they were unable to reach agreement on divisive 
issues that could be incorporated into the CDC’s work.155 
The Houthi military incursion into the capital forced the Hadi 
regime to negotiate with them.  Both parties agreed to a cease-fire 
on the condition that Hadi form a technocratic transition govern-
ment, with greater representation from the Houthis, Southern 
Hiraak Movement, and other groups that had been excluded from 
the post-Arab Spring GCC-led transition plan.156  In September 2014, 
Yemen’s major political parties (excluding the Southern separatists) 
entered into a cease-fire agreement called the Peace and National 
Partnership Agreement (PNPA) with the Houthi government, 
which was intended to bolster Houthi support for the Hadi transi-
tional government, constitutional reform, and national elections.157  
With respect to constitutional reform, the PNPA required the Hadi 
government to work towards consensus support for the draft con-
stitution and to expand representation within a body tasked with 
overseeing the CDC and implementation of the NDC outcomes.158  
The PNPA also tasked Hadi with the formation of a technocratic 
government with diverse representation from Yemen’s diverse po-
litical parties.159  Although Hadi followed the agreement and estab-
lished a technocratic government with Houthi and diverse political 
party representation, the government was unable to fulfill its man-
date for reform and to move the political transition forward due to 
ongoing violence, corruption, and political division.160 
The Houthis signed the PNPA as it gave them a greater role in 
government ministries and legitimized their efforts to take control 
                                                   
155  Gluck, supra note 23, at 52. 
156  Mareike Transfeld, The Failure of the Transitional Process in Yemen, GERMAN 
INST. INT’L & SEC. AFF. 2–3 (Feb. 2015), https://www.swp-berlin.org/filead-
min/contents/products/comments/2015C06_tfd.pdf [https://perma.cc/9P8B-
5EAF]. 
157  Gluck, supra note 23, at 52. 
158  Peace and National Partnership Agreement arts. 8-9, Sept. 21, 2014, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/docu-
ments/darp/dv/darp20141204_05_/darp20141204_05_en.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WM85-MVWH] [hereinafter PNPA]. 
159  PNPA, supra note 158, at art. 1. 
160  Transfeld, supra note 156, at 4. 
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of the government.161  Although the PNPA called for the Houthis to 
put down their arms, the Houthis continued their armed expansion 
across Yemen, arguing that it was necessary to combat a growing 
threat from Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the Is-
lamic State of Syria and Iraq (ISIS), both of which had taken ad-
vantage of the security vacuum in Yemen to expand.162  The Houthis 
also continued their military aggression in Sanaa against President 
Hadi.163  As they expanded their military campaign and took greater 
territory, the Houthis ultimately ignored their commitment under 
the PNPA to politically support the transition government and the 
constitutional reform process.164  The declining security situation 
forced the CDC to move to Abu Dhabi in November and December 
to complete its work.165 
The conflict within the CDC mirrored the civil conflict outside 
of it.  The NDC had produced over 1,800 outcomes with the inten-
tion that they would be incorporated into a new constitution by the 
CDC.  Many of the outcomes were incompatible and some issues 
had not been resolved by the NDC.  As a consequence, the CDC was 
responsible for resolving divisive issues such as the federal structure 
of the state, the allowance of regional constitutions, the division of 
power between the national and regional governments, the treat-
ment of sharia, women’s political participation, and transitional jus-
tice measures.166  This undertaking was made more difficult by 
Saleh, his allies, and Southern separatists who consistently delayed 
work within the CDC, seeking to undermine its legitimacy and the 
broader transition.167  The Houthis were also spoilers and they lim-
ited their involvement in the CDC as they began to accomplish their 
                                                   
161  INT’L CRISIS GRP., YEMEN: IS PEACE POSSIBLE? 2 (Feb. 9, 2016), 
https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-penin-
sula/yemen/yemen-peace-possible [https://perma.cc/97X5-Z4YL] [hereinafter 
ICG-Yemen]. 
162  Gluck, supra note 23, at 52–53 
163  See id. (describing the ongoing siege of Sanaa and the Houthi abduction of 
President Hadi’s Chief of Staff). 
164  See id. (discussing that the Houthis ignored the PNPA agreement and in-
stead increased their military presence in the regions south and west of the capital). 
165  Id.  
166  Helen Lackner, YEMEN’S ‘PEACEFUL’ TRANSITION FROM AUTOCRACY: COULD 
IT HAVE SUCCEEDED?, INT’L IDEA 56 (Mar. 2016), https://www.idea.int/sites/de-
fault/files/publications/yemens-peaceful-transition-from-autocracy.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Q4MR-CMXR]. 
167  See id. at 57 (discussing the tension between Saleh and Southern separatists 
that delayed efforts to solve problems). 
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political objectives through military means.168  Unlike the Houthis, 
the Southern separatists did not pursue their objectives militarily 
while the CDC was active; rather, they sought to undermine the 
CDC’s work by using delaying tactics and rejecting negotiated solu-
tions to difficult issues.169 
 
4.6.  Constitutional Conflict Deepens Civil Conflict 
 
On January 15, 2015, the CDC finalized a draft constitution and 
released it to the public.  The very same day, armed Houthis kid-
napped Ahmed Awad Bin Mubarak, President Hadi’s Chief of Staff 
and the CDC Secretary-General, as he was headed to a meeting with 
President Hadi to discuss the recently-released Constitution.170  The 
Houthis acknowledged that they kidnapped Mubarak in order to 
prevent him from attending the meeting.171  On television, the 
Houthis claimed that they had become aware of irregularities in 
how the constitution had been drafted in the CDC and in how the 
government was attempting to make it law.172  The Houthis believed 
that the draft constitution violated the spirit of the PNPA on feder-
alism.173  After kidnapping Mubarak, the Houthis surrounded and 
bombed the presidential palace five days later on January 22, 2015, 
forcing President Hadi and his government to resign.174  Hadi fled 
to Saudi Arabia and the Houthis formed a Revolutionary Command 
Council, and by declaration, claimed control of the country.175  The 
                                                   
168  See id. (explaining that the Houthis were focused on advancing their mili-
tary objectives during the CDC period). 
169  Id. 
170  Madabish, supra note 154. 
171  Mohammed Ghobari, Gunmen Hold Yemeni Official to Try to Derail New Con-
stitution, REUTERS (Jan. 17, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-secu-
rity-idUSKBN0KQ0AI20150117 [https://perma.cc/K244-TGS8]. 
172  Id. 
173  See INT’L CRISIS GRP., supra note 161, at 3 (discussing the Houthis’ rejection 
of Hadi’s version of the constitution due to its violation of PNPA’s spirit and their 
turning to violence instead).   
174  Id.; Menan Khater, Houthis Burn Presidential Palace Opposing Proposed Con-
stitutional Draft, DAILY NEWS EGYPT (Jan. 21, 2015), http://www.dailyn-
ewsegypt.com/2015/01/21/houthis-bomb-presidential-palace-opposing-pro-
posed-constitutional-draft [https://perma.cc/8CN9-4NVJ]. 
175  See INT’L CRISIS GRP., supra note 161, at 3 (discussing the Houthis’ formation 
of a “revolutionary council” with support from the U.N. and expansion of their 
military presence southward). 
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Houthis formed a military alliance of convenience with their former 
foe, President Saleh, and his military allies.176 
Hadi returned to the southern Yemen city of Aden and re-
nounced his prior resignation.177  President Hadi reestablished his 
government in Aden with the backing of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, 
and southern Yemeni factions concerned about Houthi aggression 
into their territory.178  On March 26, 2015, Saudi Arabia began an air 
campaign against the Houthi government with the goal of establish-
ing Hadi as President.  After a year of fighting, by early 2016, the 
civil war between the Houthi government in Sanaa, backed by Iran, 
and the Hadi government in Aden, backed by Saudi Arabia, had re-
sulted in 6,000 deaths, including over 2,800 civilian deaths.179  At the 
time this article was written, the draft constitution had not yet been 
submitted to the Yemeni public for a referendum and, given the op-
position of the Houthi government to its provisions, the likelihood 
of consensual support for the draft text is minimal. 
 
4.7.  Failure to Consolidate Diverse Support for the CDC 
 
A constitutional process that does not take into account the 
views of competing political factions runs the risk of exacerbating 
civil conflict.  In Yemen, where the CDC’s work failed to reflect the 
views of the Houthis and the Southern Hiraak Movement, the re-
lease of the draft constitution precipitated civil war.  Yemen’s CDC 
had a mandate to constitutionalize the consensus positions of the 
diverse political participants in the National Dialogue.  The NDC 
Outcome Document called for the CDC to implement NDC political 
agreements regarding the constitution and submit its draft constitu-
tion to a “National Body” oversight committee for confirmation that 
the text aligned with the NDC political agreements.180  Because the 
NDC did not arrive at a consensus regarding the political agreement 
on the federal structure of government, any text produced by the 
                                                   
176  Id. 
177  Id. 
178  Id. 
179  Id. at ii. 
180  See Gluck, supra note 23, at 50 (describing the National Body as an 88-mem-
ber committee tasked with assessing the consistency of the draft constitution with 
NDC solutions). 
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CDC was subject to opposition from the Houthis.181  Unfortunately, 
the NDC did not include many of the key stakeholders and political 
leaders that could arrive at a political agreement that the factions 
would honor.182 
Further, the Houthi military takeover of parts of Sanaa in Sep-
tember 2014 altered the political dynamic between the Houthis and 
the Hadi government, requiring a new political consensus on as-
pects of constitutional drafting.183  The parties tried to reach a con-
sensus with their signing of the PNPA.  However, the PNPA was 
ultimately an ineffective agreement—Houthis failed to abide by 
their commitment to end their military incursion and to support the 
CDC draft constitution.  Despite the NDC and PNPA, the constitu-
tion-making process in Yemen exhibited all of the markers of con-
flict constitution-making.  These markers include the internal battles 
in the CDC over the structure of the state, which mirrored the con-
flict between the Houthi and Hadi governments, the CDC’s inability 
to reach an agreement with key blocs such as the Houthis and South-
ern Hiraak movement regarding the structure of the state, and, ulti-
mately, the Houthis’ rejection of the final draft constitution due to 
this lack of consensus.  All of this led to their full takeover of the 
Yemen capital.  The Houthis have prevented any further action on 
the draft constitution as they have seen their political objectives 
more readily achieved through military force.  In Section 7 of this 
article, I recommend measures to move constitutional reform in 
Yemen forward, building upon the significant work already under-
taken. 
 
5.  CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN IN MULTIETHNIC                          
TRANSITIONING STATES 
 
In multiethnic sectarian societies such as Libya and Yemen, in-
tergroup conflicts are frequently a source of civil discord (hereinaf-
ter, I will refer to such conflicts as interethnic conflicts).  Transition-
ing states have sought to address the problem of interethnic conflicts 
in various ways.  Some states have done so through constitutional 
                                                   
181  Id. 
182  Id. 
183  See id. at 52 (emphasizing that the unstable political environment at the 
time made political bargaining and negotiations critical to the process of drafting a 
stable constitution). 
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structures expressly designed to accommodate ethnic cleavages.  
Since interethnic conflicts are frequently regional in nature, states 
have also sought to address such conflict through various forms of 
federalism and decentralization.  In Section 5.1, I discuss various 
constitutional design approaches that address interethnic conflicts 
through ethnic accommodation and ethnic moderation.  In Section 
5.2, I discuss models of constitutional design that address inter-
ethnic regional conflicts through federalism and decentralization. 
 
5.1.  Models for Multiethnic Governance 
 
Comparative constitutional scholarship refers to two constitu-
tional design approaches for addressing interethnic conflicts in 
highly divided societies: consociationalism and centripetalism.184  
Consociational and centripetal design features are incorporated into 
constitutions and electoral laws in order to secure multiethnic sup-
port for a state’s democratic institutions of governance.  Consocia-
tionalism focuses on the accommodation of ethnic groups through 
guaranteed group representation in governing bodies.  Centripetal-
ism focuses on the moderation of ethnic group views through the 
election of moderate officials that represent multiethnic constituen-
cies. 
 
5.1.1.  Consociationalism — Ethnic Accommodation 
 
Under consociational democracy, ethnic groups are granted a 
fair amount of autonomy over their affairs, a veto or partial veto 
over the central government’s decisions, and proportional represen-
tation in government institutions.185  Consociationalism is designed 
to protect ethnic groups from harm by other ethnic groups or by the 
central government.186  Because consociationalism seeks to protect 
                                                   
184  See Donald Horowitz, Conciliatory Institutions and Constitutional Processes in 
Post-Conflict States, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1213, 1216–17 (2008) (explaining the dif-
ference between the consociationalism design, which is centered on a “regime of 
guarantees,” and the centripetalism design, which focuses on electoral incentives). 
185  See Karol Edward Soltan, Constitution-Making at the Edges of Constitutional 
Order, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1409, 1423–24 (2008) (elaborating on the defining 
characteristics of a consociational democracy). 
186  Id. at 1424. 
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competing groups, one scholar has described consociationalism as 
“a peace treaty extended into the workings of government.”187  Con-
sociationalists recognize and accommodate ethnic group identity 
and give them status qua ethnic groups within democratic institu-
tions.  Consociationalists advocate for multiethnic governing coali-
tions—parliamentary, executive, and administrative positions are 
allocated on a proportional group basis through proportional par-
liamentary electoral systems, multiethnic cabinets that operate by 
consensus, and proportional hiring in the civil service and the mili-
tary.188  Consociationalists guarantee multiethnic outcomes through 
multiethnic “seats” in bodies.  Under consociational models, a ma-
joritarian democracy accommodates ethnic diversity through the ex-
plicit guarantee of ethnic representation in political bodies.  Some 
have critiqued consociationalism by saying that it accommodates 
ethnic extremists because group representatives represent “their” 
ethnic group exclusively.189 
Within the MENA region, consociational democratic features 
have been attempted in highly divided multiethnic states.  Lebanon 
was a consociational democracy from its independence in 1943 until 
its civil war in 1975.190  In the mid-twentieth century, Lebanon was 
30% Maronite Christian, 20% Sunni Muslim, 18% Shiite Muslim, and 
11% Greek Orthodox.  Lebanon had smaller sects of either Christian 
or Muslim background.191  Lebanon had a quasi-presidential system 
that included a Maronite president, a Sunni prime minister, a Shiite 
chairman of the legislature, and a Greek Orthodox deputy chairman 
and deputy prime minister.192  The cabinet was also a grand coalition 
in which all of the sects were proportionately represented.193  A plu-
rality and multimember electoral system resulted in a parliament 
that consistently had a ratio of six Christian members to every five 
                                                   
187  Id.  
188  See Horowitz, supra note 184, at 1216 (emphasizing that the consociational-
ist design is rooted in the principle of proportional inclusion and a group culture). 
189  Id. at 1216–17. 
190  See Samuel Barnes, The Contribution of Democracy to Rebuilding Postconflict 
Societies, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 86, 97 (2001) (citing Arend Lijpart, DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL 
SOCIETIES (1977)) (discussing an example of a plural society that successfully incor-
porated the features of a consociational democracy). 
191  AREND LIJPHART, DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES: A COMPARATIVE 
EXPLORATION 147 (1977). 
192  Id. at 148. 
193  Id. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018
  
332 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 39:2 
Muslim members.194  This system worked effectively for more than 
thirty years.195  Iraq also adopted consociational democratic features 
following the passage of its 2004 interim transitional constitution 
and its 2005 permanent constitution to address significant political 
tensions among the Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish communities.  The in-
terim constitution created a tri-partite Presidency Council, consist-
ing of a President and two Vice Presidents and the 2005 constitution 
created a Speaker and two Deputy Speakers.196  Both the interim and 
permanent constitutions authorized a Prime Minister and Council 
of Ministers.197  During the transition period, the Prime Minister rou-
tinely selected two Deputy Prime Ministers.  By political agreement, 
each of the positions within these tri-partite leadership bodies was 
filled by a Shiite, Sunni, and Kurdish official.198 
 
5.1.2.  Centripetalism — Ethnic Moderation 
 
Centripetal democracies are designed to reward moderate be-
havior at the expense of extremists.  Centripetal design features in 
constitutions and electoral laws incentivize moderate politicians 
within ethnic groups to compromise with moderate politicians in 
other ethnic groups.199  Centripetal democracies contain mecha-
nisms to elevate moderate ethnic representatives and parties, such 
                                                   
194  Id. 
195  Id. 
196 See IRAQ: LAW OF 2004 OF ADMINISTRATION FOR THE STATE OF IRAQ FOR THE 
TRANSITIONAL PERIOD Mar. 8, 2004, art. 36, http://www.refworld.org/do-
cid/45263d612.html            
[http://web.archive.org/web/20171030192021/http://www.refworld.org/do-
cid/45263d612.html] [hereinafter TAL] (establishing the Presidency Council).  TAL 
was adopted by the Iraq Governing Council while Iraq was administered by the 
U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority and served as a post-Saddam interim con-
stitution; see also Dustūr Jumhūrīyat al-ʻIrāq [The Constitution of the Republic of 
Iraq] of 2005, art. 54 (establishing a Speaker and two Deputy Speakers). 
197  TAL, art. 38 supra note 196; Article 76, Dustūr Jumhūrīyat al-ʻIrāq [The 
Constitution of the Republic of Iraq] of 2005, supra note 194. 
198 See Sean D. Murphy, ed., Coalition Laws and Transition Arrangements During 
Occupation of Iraq, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 601, 604 (2004) (recounting the appointment of 
Sheik Ghazi al-Yawar, a Sunni Muslim, to the position of Iraqi interim president, 
along with a Kurd and a Shia Muslim as his deputy presidents).  
199 See Soltan, supra note 185, at 1424 (explaining that the centripetal approach 
focuses on collaboration among moderate politicians at the expense of excluding 
extremists). 
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as multiethnic electoral districts and interethnic coalitions.200  Cen-
tripetalists believe that these approaches support moderation be-
cause individual representatives and coalition members must repre-
sent a multiplicity of views, rather than the views of their ethnic 
group exclusively.  Centripetalists apply a wide range of tools to 
support moderates such as the alternative vote—a system that al-
lows for the interethnic exchange of second and subsequent voting 
preferences, and requiring electoral victors to receive a plurality of 
the vote across an ethnically diverse territorial area.201 
Centripetal arrangements that encourage the election of moder-
ates with a multiethnic perspective can take many forms.  Nigeria 
adopted electoral reforms that required presidential candidates to 
obtain not only a plurality of the national vote, but also 25% of the 
vote in two thirds of its provinces, to encourage candidates with a 
moderate multiethnic outlook.202  Papua New Guinea adopted the 
alternative vote system which required candidates to obtain support 
from multiple groups in their constituencies in order to pass the ma-
jority vote threshold; after the country dropped alternative voting, 
candidates were elected based upon their ethnic group pluralities 
and interethnic group conflict increased.203  Centripetalism is most 
effective in states that have heterogeneous electoral districts where 
the interethnic pooling of votes can occur.204 
 
5.2.  Models for Allocation of State Power in Divided States 
 
The civil conflicts in Libya and Yemen reflect significant ethno-
regional tensions (discussed supra Sections 3 and 4).  The allocation 
of state power between the central and local governments was a 
driver of civil conflict in both countries.  Comparative constitutional 
scholars have suggested various models of allocating state power to 
                                                   
200 See Horowitz, supra note 184, at 1217 (explaining that the underlying mech-
anism of the centripetal approach consists of politicians compromising on ethnic 
issues in order to appeal for voter support from disparate ethnic groups).  
201  Id. 
202  Id. at 1224. 
203  Id. at 1224–5. 
204  See id. at 1225 (explaining that without interethnic vote pooling, legislators, 
who represent smaller and more ethnically homogenous areas, have smaller incen-
tives to appeal to other ethnic groups for support). 
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address ethno-regional conflict.  These models include ethnic feder-
alism and political decentralization, which focus on the devolution 
of state power in a manner intended to reduce ethnic divisions. 
 
5.2.1.  Ethnic Federalism 
 
Federalism refers to the sharing of state power between a na-
tional authority and subnational or regional authority.205  Ethnic fed-
eralism is “a term used to describe a particular set of governmental 
arrangements specifically designed to ameliorate conflict among or 
between [ethnic] subgroups in a sharply divided state.”206  Ethnic 
federalism is a form of consociationalism as it reflects the elements 
of that system:  (1) executive power-sharing among the representa-
tives of all significant groups; (2) a high degree of internal autonomy 
for groups that wish to have it; (3) proportional representation and 
proportional allocation of civil service positions and public funds; 
and (4) a minority veto on the most vital issues.207  As with other 
forms of consociationalism, some scholars have questioned whether 
ethnic federalism exacerbates or ameliorates ethnic conflict.208  Eth-
nic federalism has been part of the transitional constitution-making 
process in several states that have experienced ethno-regional con-
flicts such as South Africa, Ethiopia, and Iraq.209  While systems of 
federalism often differ, some of the characteristics of a constitutional 
system premised on ethnic federalism are as follows: 
 
                                                   
205  See Alemante G. Selassie, Ethnic Federalism: Its Promise and Pitfalls for Africa, 
28 YALE J. INT’L L. 51, 56–58 (2003) (explaining that federalism contains two essential 
attributes: (1) dispersion of power among many centers of authority and (2) exist-
ence of constitutional mandates that legitimize the various centers of authority’s 
claims of rights against the central government). 
206  Id. at 54 (internal citations omitted).  See e.g., Ludsin, supra note 22, at 290 
(describing the insertion of ethnic federalism clauses into Nepal’s 2006 Interim Con-
stitution, which led to the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Accord later that 
year). 
207  David Wippman, International Law and Ethnic Conflict on Cyprus, 31 TEX. 
INT’L L. J. 141, 173 n.220 (1996). 
208  See Selassie, supra note 205, at 86 (asserting that ethnic federalism exacer-
bates ethnic distrust and social discord because it deliberately and openly high-
lights ethnic differences that might otherwise fade with time). 
209  See Horowitz, supra note 184, at 1218 (discussing how both consociational-
ists and centripetalists support federal approaches to governance, although for dif-
ferent reasons). 
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5.2.1.1.  Protections for Cultural and Linguistic Identity 
 
The protection of an ethnic group’s distinct cultural and linguis-
tic identity within a broader national culture frequently underlies an 
ethnic group’s desire for political autonomy.  The South African 
Constitution recognizes ethnic groups’ rights to their own lan-
guages and cultures, and reinforces those rights through a federal 
form of government that empowers provinces to protect those 
rights.210 
 
5.2.1.2.  Ethnicity-Based “Self-Rule” 
 
Some states have permitted subnational “self-rule” on the basis 
of ethnic identity to address ethnic groups’ desire for cultural, lin-
guistic and political autonomy.  For example, the Ethiopian Consti-
tution provides for a model of ethnic federalism that allows subna-
tional groups to have self-governing status on the basis of their 
ethnic identity.211  The entire Ethiopian state is organized along an 
ethnic federal form of government that consists of nine ethnic based 
federal states.212  Most Sub-Saharan African (SSA) states have 
avoided Ethiopia’s model of constitutional recognition of federal 
self-rule, but ethnic groups have continued to press for ethnic-based 
federal self-rule in a number of SSA countries, often because of their 
historic presence and concentration in particular regions of a coun-
try.213 
 
 
                                                   
210  Selassie, supra note 205, at 54. 
211 See id. (discussing the inclusive approach to ethnic identity that the Ethio-
pian Constitution provides). 
212 See id. at 54–55 (noting that eight of the nine provinces were organized along 
ethnic lines to make the province the principle vehicle for aggregating major ethnic 
groups’ political, cultural, and linguistic identity).  The Ethiopian model of ethnic 
federalism goes much further than South Africa’s model which does not organize 
provinces primarily along ethnic lines.   
213 See id. at 60 (highlighting the fact that many ethnic groups within African 
countries have staged uprisings against the central government to demand official 
recognition of their separate social identities). 
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5.2.1.3.  Subnational Constitutions 
 
Some, but not all, federal systems permit subnational units to 
create their own constitutions.  Some subnational constitutional 
scholars have argued that merely the authority to create a subna-
tional constitution, even if it is not exercised, can serve important 
conflict reduction goals.214  The transition constitutions of South Af-
rica and Iraq both included provisions which allowed for regional 
governments to develop subnational constitutions as part of the 
power-sharing arrangement negotiated among major ethnic 
groups.215  In some circumstances, difficult issues that could not be 
resolved during national constitution-making processes, can be de-
ferred to the regional constitution-making process.216 
 
5.2.1.4.  Political and Legal Autonomy 
 
Federal systems are designed to provide a degree of autonomy 
to regional governments to resolve legal and political and govern-
ance matters left to their competency by the national constitution.  
Though rare, some federal arrangements, such as the Ethiopian 
Constitution, provide an option for a region to secede.217  However, 
it is more typical for negotiators to grant significant autonomy, short 
                                                   
214 See Jonathan L. Marshfield, Authorizing Subnational Constitutions in Transna-
tional Federal States: South Africa, Democracy, and the KwaZulu-Natal Constitution, 41 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 585, 589–90 (2008) (discussing how, although certain prov-
inces did not create their own subnational constitutions, gaining the authority to do 
so was an important part of the political settlement to mitigate inter-ethnic conflict). 
215  See id. (describing the strategic provisions in transition constitutions that 
help create a smooth transition of power); see generally Michael J. Kelly, The Kurdish 
Regional Constitutional within the Framework of the Iraqi Federal Constitution: A Struggle 
for Sovereignty, Oil, Ethnic Identity, and the Prospects for a Reverse Supremacy Clause, 
114 PENN ST. L. REV. 707 (2010) (discussing the creation and adoption of the Kurdish 
regional constitution). 
216  See Kelly, supra note 215, at 746 (discussing that one such issue left unre-
solved in the federal constitution was the status of the oil rich city of Kirkuk in Iraq, 
wherein both Baghdad and the Region of Kurdistan wanted to maintain control of 
Kirkuk and the Iraqi constitution deferred resolution of the issue to a referendum; 
ultimately, the regional Kurdish constitution defined Kirkuk as part of the Kurdish 
region).  
217  See Selassie, supra note 205, at 54 (discussing how the ethnic-federal system 
of government in Ethiopia enables it to accommodate ethnic groups’ cultural, lin-
guistic, and political decisions). 
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of secession, to ethnic groups, such as the Kurds in Iraq, in order to 
keep the regional ethnic group within the state.218 
 
5.2.2.  Political Decentralization 
 
Whereas federal governments share political power with re-
gional governments, unitary states decentralize administrative au-
thority to local governments, as an extension of unitary national 
power.219  Federal systems create subnational (regional) governance 
structures such as governors, regional parliaments, and regional 
courts that exercise exclusive or concurrent powers with the central 
government.  Unlike federalism, unitary state decentralization does 
not require the creation of subnational regional governance struc-
tures to share power with the central government.  Decentralization 
is an administrative delegation of central authority to subordinate 
geographic or functional units.220  Unitary states may engage in de-
centralization by devolving central authority to the local level.221 
The objectives of federalism and decentralization may also dif-
fer.  As discussed supra, federalism can ease tensions in highly di-
vided societies with ethnic groups centered in different regions by 
providing a degree of ethno-regional autonomy.222  In a democratic 
system, decentralization serves important objectives beyond the 
mere administration of central authority—decentralization fosters 
democratic stability by supporting individual rights and collective 
self-government.223  One scholar argues that democratic decentrali-
zation gives people better incentives, more opportunity to exercise 
                                                   
218  See Kelly, supra note 215, at 726 (explaining that the Kurds settled for a 
federal structure of autonomy and regionalism). 
219  CTR. FOR CONST. TRANSITIONS ET AL., DECENTRALIZATION IN UNITARY STATES: 
CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS FOR THE ARAB STATES REGION 11 (2014) [hereinafter 
DECENTRALIZATION IN UNITARY STATES]. 
220  Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on A National 
Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 910 (1994). 
221  See Frank B. Cross, The Folly of Federalism, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 2 (2002) 
(arguing that in some circumstances unitary governments devolve even more 
power to local governments than federal systems). 
222  See DECENTRALIZATION IN UNITARY STATES, supra note 219, at 12 (noting that 
one goal of a federal system of governance is to ease tensions between different 
groups in society). 
223  See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Is Federalism Good for Localism? The Localist Case 
for Federal Regimes, 21 J.L. & POL. 187, 190–91 (2005) (critiquing Rubin and Feely for 
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their rights, and less reason to oppress one another.224  These are the 
precise interests that individuals in highly divided ethno-regionally 
diverse societies have in a reconstructed state—the ability to exer-
cise their rights free of oppression. 
In examining the different forms by which democratic decentral-
ization may occur, it is helpful to use Professor Hills’ rubric of fed-
eralist, unitary, and localist democracies.225  The attributes of a fed-
eralist democracy were discussed supra.  A unitary democracy exists 
where the central government may devolve power and responsibil-
ities to a subnational local entity but that entity or subnational unit 
receives no protections in the national constitution or law—its au-
thority and existence are at the whim of the central government.  In 
a unitary democracy, the local subnational unit exists merely as an 
instrumentation of the central government and carries out national 
law in accordance with local conditions.226  In a localist democracy, 
the local government is granted authority under the national consti-
tution, which protects it from interference by the national govern-
ment (or regional government, if one exists) in its areas of compe-
tency.227 
In ethno-regionally divided societies, a federalist or localist de-
mocracy may each be beneficial, as both approaches comprise con-
stitutional guarantees that ethnic groups will have control over their 
affairs at the regional and/or local level.  In some circumstances, a 
decentralized localist democracy might be preferred to a federalist 
democracy.  For example, national governments might fear that an 
ethnically-defined regional government in a highly divided state 
might seek to declare independence from the state—a recurring fear 
of the national governments of Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Turkey, regard-
ing Iraq’s Kurdish Region.228  Devolving power to local authorities 
                                                   
characterizing the value of decentralization as primarily being administrative effi-
ciency, and stating that it serves fundamental purposes crucial to democracy). 
224  See id. at 191 (arguing that decentralization feeds into the goals of self-gov-
ernment). 
225  See id. at 195–99 (distinguishing decentralized regimes into “federalist,” 
“unitary,” or “localist” based on the central government’s power to regulate and 
interfere with local governments). 
226  See id. at 198 (discussing how subnational governments in a unitary democ-
racy don’t receive legal protection, and thus function to carry out national law). 
227  Id. at 199. 
228  See Kelly, supra note 215, at 726 (noting Syria, Iran, and Turkey’s concern 
that an independent Kurdistan may lead to secessionist movements among their 
own Kurdish populations).  This fear of ethnic secession is not unfounded.  As the 
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rather than to regional governments is an alternative constitutional 
design option that supports local autonomy, without empowering a 
regional government that might compete with the state.  In divided 
multiethnic states, such as Kosovo, the creation of decentralized lo-
cal governments across ethnic lines helped to prevent the partition 
of the state along ethnic lines by creating local institutions in which 
Kosovar Serbs and Albanians cooperated.  In such environments, lo-
cal decentralization fosters national unity and stability to a greater 
degree than regional federalism.229 
The MENA region has a history of highly centralized and au-
thoritarian state structures, with weak democratic practices and 
very little decentralization.230  Over the past decade, Saudi Arabia, 
Bahrain, Jordan and Oman have held local government council elec-
tions.  However, the councils have had little to no authority dele-
gated to them from the central government.231  In Egypt, local peo-
ple’s councils elected under Mubarak had no authority over local 
executive officials who were representatives of central government 
ministries.232  The Arab Spring transitions opened up political space 
for the devolution of power away from the central government 
throughout the MENA region.  However, the quality and nature of 
the political decentralization in a specific state will determine 
whether it fosters greater democratic accountability and local citizen 
engagement.  The models of political governance and state power 
allocation that Libya and Yemen adopted in their draft constitutions 
are assessed in Section 6. 
                                                   
International Court of Justice determined in its Advisory Opinion regarding Ko-
sovo’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence, such declarations of independence 
by ethnically defined regions are not violations of general international law and 
may represent a people’s appropriate exercise of their right to self-determination; 
see also Elena Cirkovic, An Analysis of the ICJ Advisory Opinion on Kosovo’s Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence, 11 German L.J. 895, 900 (2010) (discussing the dialogue 
surrounding the right to external self-determination and the recognition of states 
that do break off within the broader arena of international law). 
229  See DECENTRALIZATION IN UNITARY STATES, supra note 219, at 30 (explaining 
that decentralization preserves national stability by broadening citizenship partici-
pation and fragmenting central power). 
230  See id. at 14 (noting that political elites within the region have traditionally 
exploited nationalism and regional conflicts to preserve the need for strong, cen-
tralized states). 
231  Out of these four governments, Jordan is the only one that has delegated 
some of its central authority to the local government councils, although it revoked 
it shortly after.  See id. at 35–36 (characterizing recent waves of decentralization 
within the MENA region as “primarily cosmetic.”). 
232   Id. at 36. 
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6.  CONFLICT CONSTITUTIONS IN LIBYA AND YEMEN 
 
Despite their ongoing civil wars, both Yemen and Libya pro-
duced draft constitutions in 2015 and early 2016.  Both countries ad-
dressed regional and sectarian divisions in distinct ways.  Libya 
opted for unitary decentralization, concentrating power at the na-
tional level and devolving limited authorities to the governorate and 
local level.  Yemen adopted a federal structure with consociational 
design features at the national level and significant allocation of 
power to the regions.  Both constitutions, however, contained ele-
ments that promised to prolong the conflicts that sparked the civil 
wars and impacted the constitutional drafting processes. 
 
6.1.  Libya’s 2016 Draft Constitution 
 
Libya’s draft constitution fails to include consociational or cen-
tripetal design features that explicitly accommodate or moderate 
ethnic group divisions.  And rather than designing a federal system 
that empowers Libya’s three historic regions as political entities, the 
CDA instead drafted a constitution that creates a “unitary” state sys-
tem by concentrating power in the central government and devolv-
ing more limited authorities to local councils.  This unitary decen-
tralized state design is referenced in the constitution’s preamble, 
where the drafters exhort the preservation of the country’s unity by 
continuing “with the establishment of the Libyan State in 1951 with 
the three provinces (Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, and Fezzan), then their 
transition into a united states as of 1963.”233  The 1963 transition re-
fers to the removal of federal provisions from the 1951 constitution 
and the formation of ten governorates and local municipalities.234  
The drafters appear to avoid the creation of regional organizational 
structures that might be perceived as competition to the central gov-
ernment.  Article I of the constitution makes this clear by stating that 
                                                   
233  DRAFT LIBYAN CONST., supra note 87, pmbl.  
234  See Schnelzer, supra note 24, at 32 (recounting that rapid economic changes, 
which were spurred by the 1959 discovery of vast oil reserves in Libya, created so-
cial conflicts between the Libyan people and their political leadership and moti-
vated the 1963 administrative transition).  
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Libya shall be an “indivisible state” and that “it shall not be permis-
sible to relinquish any part of its sovereignty nor its territory.”235  
The fact that drafters opted for a unitary state without competing 
regional power structures is not surprising given Libya’s history of 
regional tensions and the desire of nationalists in the CDA to con-
tinue the concentration of power in the central government. 
The draft constitution, however, did not sufficiently address the 
underlying tensions that led to civil war between the Libyan Dawn 
and Operation Dignity forces, or that led minority groups to boycott 
the CDA’s constitution-drafting process.  The Libyan Dawn coali-
tion’s pursuit of political power through arms was catalyzed by the 
defeat of Islamist politicians in the parliamentary elections for the 
House of Representatives.  The constitution favorably addressed an 
issue of importance to Islamists by providing that sharia shall be the 
source for legislation and creating a council of Islamic experts to 
opine on the requirements of Islamic law.236  The constitution also 
prohibits the existence of paramilitary organizations or security 
forces outside of the state run army—a provision likely to lead to 
significant opposition from the Islamist affiliated Libyan Dawn 
forces and Libya’s many extensive paramilitary organizations.237  
The enforcement of the provision by state security forces will likely 
lead to significant armed opposition from Libya’s militia groups, as 
occurred during General Haftar’s Operation Dignity efforts to quell 
militia activity. 
The constitution also failed to sufficiently address the concerns 
of minority groups, which raises the potential for minority opposi-
tion to the constitution and sustained conflict.  The CDA, whose mi-
nority group members left in boycott as discussed supra Section 3.3., 
enshrined a specific preference for Arabic identity and Arabic lan-
guage into the constitution, by declaring Libya to be an Arabic State 
and declaring Arabic as Libya’s official language.238  The CDA also 
limited the offices of President and Prime Minister exclusively to 
Muslims.239  While minority languages are given some protection 
under various provisions, Arabic and Muslim identity are clearly fa-
vored statuses under the constitution.240  The provisions adopted by 
                                                   
235  DRAFT LIBYAN CONST., supra note 87, art. 1. 
236  Id. at art. 8, 172. 
237  Id. at art. 192. 
238  Id. at art. 2.  
239  Id. at art. 110, 125. 
240  Id. at art. 2, 64, 117.  
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the CDA would have faced opposition from minority groups if they 
had continued their involvement within the CDA.  Because the CDA 
developed language addressing minority group rights without mi-
nority group input, the CDA risked long term minority group op-
position to the constitution and sustained conflict over its provi-
sions.  The CDA could have opted for a consociational model of 
governance and allocated reserved seats in parliament and in exec-
utive institutions to minority groups in order to secure their sup-
port.  However, they missed this opportunity. 
The draft Libyan constitution also provides the foundation for 
continued conflict between local authorities and the central govern-
ment.  The constitution states that local authorities will have auton-
omous, transferrable, and shared powers with the central govern-
ment but it does not define how those shared powers will be 
exercised in concert with the central government.241  As such, the 
constitution is a unitary democracy, rather than a localist democ-
racy.  As discussed supra Section 5, a localist democracy grants and 
protects local competencies, whereas in a unitary democracy, the au-
thorities of the local entity are at the whim of the central govern-
ment.  Undefined political decentralization in the constitution can 
lead to the national government granting and revoking limited au-
thorities, as occurred in Jordan. The lack of defined local authority 
will lead to disputes when local concerns conflict with national pri-
orities.  The constitution also provides that in addition to receiving 
centralized resources, local governments will have the authority to 
raise local taxes and the central government will ensure financial 
balance among local government units.242  This provision along with 
a provision giving the central government control over natural re-
sources and the ability to redistribute those resources among re-
gions is likely to lead to local and regional conflicts surrounding the 
distribution of resources.243 
Many of the conflicts embedded in the draft constitution were 
foreseeable given Libya’s sectarian divisions but the conflict-ridden 
drafting process ensured non-consensual results.  Minority groups 
opposed certain provisions because they were effectively excluded 
from the process and the Islamist Libya Dawn coalition opposed an 
elected constituent assembly in which Islamists were not signifi-
cantly represented.  Despite these tensions surrounding the CDA, 
                                                   
241  Id. at art. 158. 
242  DRAFT LIBYAN CONST., supra note 87, art. 159. 
243  Id. at art. 185. 
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the United Nations was able to garner consensus political support 
for Libya’s draft constitution with the December 2015 UN Brokered 
Political Agreement.  The peace agreement, supported by both the 
Tobruk and Tripoli governments, created one unified national gov-
ernment and committed both warring factions to support the work 
of the CDA.  This commitment offers hope that despite the CDA’s 
internal disputes, both parties to the civil war may ultimately seek 
their political objectives peacefully under the constitutional regime 
established by the draft constitution.244  For long term constitutional 
stability, the Libyan public will need to accept any new constitution 
as legitimate.  Section 7 will discuss steps that the Libyan govern-
ment can take to increase public support for the constitution. 
 
6.2.  Yemen’s 2015 Draft Constitution 
 
The CDC’s completion of a draft constitution precipitated the 
Houthi bombing of the Presidential Palace and takeover of Yemen’s 
capital city, Aden.245  In justifying the Houthi’s actions, Abdel Malik 
Al-Houthi, the leader of the Houthi movement, went on television 
and announced that he opposed the draft constitution because it did 
not implement the NDC outcomes, failed to reflect the views of the 
Houthis and Southern groups, and that in creating six regions, the 
constitution would “tear Yemen apart and . . . raise more con-
flict.”246  The draft constitution released by the CDC reflected the 
                                                   
244  As of the time of writing, the unity government—Government of National 
Accord—has been installed in Tripoli.  The Libya Dawn backed General National 
Congress in Tripoli disbanded, although its supporting militias continue to operate 
in Tripoli.  The General Haftar-based House of Representatives in Tobruk has con-
tinued to operate in the East.  Ken Hanly, Op-Ed: Libyan Government of National Ac-
cord Asks for NATO Training Help, DIGITAL J. (Feb. 17, 2017), http://www.digi-
taljournal.com/news/world/op-ed-libyan-government-of-national-accord-asks-
for-nato-training-help/article/486099 [https://perma.cc/6QJV-3K66]. 
245  See Menan Khater, Houthis Bomb Presidential Palace Opposing Proposed Con-
stitutional Draft, DAILY NEWS EGYPT (Jan. 21, 2015), http://www.dailyn-
ewsegypt.com/2015/01/21/houthis-bomb-presidential-palace-opposing-pro-
posed-constitutional-draft [https://perma.cc/8CN9-4NVJ] (reporting on Houthi 
rebel militias’ decision to bomb the presidential palace after they took over much 
of Sanaa in September 2015). 
246  Id.  
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NDC’s tabled proposal to create a federal state with six regions.247  
Although the NDC did not agree to the proposal, three weeks after 
the NDC produced its outcomes, President Hadi convened a small 
committee that adopted the six-region solution over the objection of 
Southern leaders.248  From the perspective of the Houthis and the 
Southern Hiraak Movement leaders, the six region federal solution 
was an illegitimate approach. 
In addition to the conflict over the federal structure of the state, 
the division of authority between the regions and the central gov-
ernment will continue to be a source of conflict between nationalists 
and Southern Secessionists and other groups desiring regional au-
tonomy.  Yemen’s 2015 draft constitution appears to give conces-
sions to both sides.  It creates an empowered national government 
with consociational features to ensure broad representation from the 
regions.  By creating a federal structure, the constitution also de-
volves certain authorities to the six regions. 
Ethno-sectarian divisions in Yemen exist along geographic and 
religious lines.  Shiite Muslims of the Zaidi denomination are lo-
cated in the Western mountainous regions and comprise forty per-
cent of Yemeni society—the Houthis are political actors of Zaidi 
background.249  Both coasts and the southeastern interior of Yemen 
are populated primarily by Sunni Muslims of the Shaffii denomina-
tion, who make up more than 50% of Yemen’s population.250  The 
draft constitution creates four regions (Aljanad, Azal, Sheba, 
Tahamh) in the north and two regions (Aden, Hadramaut) in the 
south based upon Yemen’s existing provinces (also known as “wila-
yas”).251  The draft constitution subsumes the Saada wilaya, the 
Houthi’s home base, within the Northern two-province Azal re-
gion.252  This raised concerns for the Houthis that their political 
                                                   
247  2015 DRAFT YEMENI CONST., art. 391, http://www.constitution-
net.org/sites/default/files/2017-07/2015%20-%20Draft%20constitu-
tion%20%28English%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/379J-4SYV] (last visited October 
23, 2017). 
248  See GASTON, supra note 139, at 4 (explaining that the six-region proposal, 
comprised of four northern and two southern regions, was adopted by a special 
committee that was hand selected by President Hadi despite NDC’s recommenda-
tion to table the issue for future resolution). 
249  Babak Ghafarzade, Yemen: Post-Conflict Federalism to Avoid Disintegration, 
48 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 933, 942 (2016).  
250  Id. 
251  2015 DRAFT YEMENI CONST., supra note 247, art. 391. 
252  See Ghafarzade, supra note 249, at 994 (explaining that while the draft con-
stitution did not change any borders of the existing wilayas, its establishment of new 
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power and autonomy would be diluted under the new region and 
prompted their military takeover of Sanaa.253  The division of the 
South, into four separate regions, rather than one—may have been 
intended by nationalists as a bulwark against secession.  The South-
ern Hiraak Movement’s opposition to the creation of multiple re-
gions in the South will embed a lingering conflict into the final con-
stitution should it be adopted.254 
Although Yemen’s draft constitution expressly prohibits racial, 
sectarian, and religious parties, its provisions support de facto eth-
nic federalism.255  Consociational features in the constitution pro-
vide for diverse representation from Yemen’s ethno-religious sects 
based upon geographic, rather than explicitly sectarian, alloca-
tion.256  For example, the House of Representatives, the lower cham-
ber of the parliament is made up of 260 representatives elected un-
der a closed proportional list system and after the first legislative 
cycle, the Southern Regions of Aden and Hadhramout are guaran-
teed 40% representation in the legislature.257  The eighty-four mem-
ber Federal Council, the upper house of parliament, is represented 
with an equal number of twelve representatives from each of the six 
regions and six representatives from the cities of Aden and Sanaa 
(the competing capitals).258  This model guarantees that the Shaffi, 
Southern Hiraak, and other southern sectarian groups will have 40% 
representation in the legislature.  It also guarantees that ethnically 
defined regional strongholds such as the Houthi home base in Azal 
will have an equal number of representatives in the legislature as 
other regions.  Consociational features also apply to the courts and 
the armed services.  The Supreme Federal Judicial Council includes 
one member of the High Court of each region.259  Further, the Con-
                                                   
federal regions created social tensions because they did not wholly track existing 
religious divisions). 
253  See id. at 994–95 (speculating that further contest over the creation of new 
federal regions might lead to increased violence and calls for secession). 
254  See INT’L CRISIS GRP., supra note 143, at ii (noting that Yemeni hopes for a 
more stable future depend upon both sides’ abilities to establish basic trust, legiti-
macy, and consensus within negotiations). 
255  2015 DRAFT YEMENI CONST., supra note 247, art. 13. 
256  Id. at art. 13(5) (“It is prohibited to establish political parties and organiza-
tions on the basis of racial, sectarian or doctrinal grounds.”) 
257  Id. at arts. 138–39. 
258  Id. at art. 141.  
259  Id. at art. 219. 
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stitutional Court is to include representation from all of the re-
gions.260  The regions are also entitled to equitable representation in 
the command structures of the armed forces (as determined by 
law).261  Additional concessions are given to the Southern Regions—
for example, decisions in the Federal Council are taken by majority 
vote, but if two-thirds of the representatives from Southern regions 
oppose a decision dealing with natural resources including oil and 
gas, electoral law matters, regional boundaries, the shape of the Fed-
eral State, the special status of the city of Aden, or any constitutional 
amendment relevant to Southern representation, they may veto the 
proposal.262 
Some features in the constitution could also be considered cen-
tripetal, in that they encourage ethnic moderates who can appeal to 
multiethnic constituencies.  Candidates for President must be en-
dorsed by 5% of the members of one of the national legislative bod-
ies, or by signatures of 6,000 voters from a majority of regions, with 
at least 500 signatures from each region.263  The President and Vice 
President are elected together on the same ticket provided they hail 
from different regions.264 
In addition to ensuring diverse regional representation at the 
federal level, Yemen’s draft constitution also envisions empowered 
regional governments.  The constitution creates a parallel structure 
to the national government at the regional level, including execu-
tive, legislative and judicial branches.  Like at the national level, re-
gional parliaments are elected under a proportional list system.265  
The parliaments are given the authority to pass laws on regional 
matters based on competencies defined in the constitution.266  The 
regional government has competencies some of which are exclu-
sive267 and others of which are concurrent with the national govern-
ment.268  The constitution also establishes regional governors with 
                                                   
260  Id. at art. 329. 
261  Id. at art. 311 
262  Id. at art. 143. 
263  Id. at art. 183.  
264  Id. at art. 180. 
265  Id. at art. 230. 
266  Id. at art. 237. 
267  Id. at art. 337. 
268  Id. at art. 336. 
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executive authority.269  First level courts are established in the dis-
tricts, appellate courts in the wilayas and supreme courts in the re-
gions.270  The rulings of the regional supreme courts are final, except 
for matters falling in the competency of the Federal Supreme 
Court.271  The Constitution also requires that each regional legisla-
ture draft and adopt a regional constitution, provided that it may 
not conflict with the federal constitution.272  Each region is tasked 
with passing its own regional budget and local laws.273  The consti-
tution also bans political parties, individuals, or groups from form-
ing armed wings or militias.274 
While these consociational features are intended to address re-
gional and sectarian divisions, the Houthis rebel movement and 
Southern Hiraak Movement separatists have made clear their oppo-
sition to a six-region state and their preference for a two-region 
country.275  Given the ongoing civil war and the diverging positions 
of the competing governments on the structure of the federal gov-
ernment, the draft constitution is likely to be an ongoing source of 
conflict—unless a political agreement between the competing gov-
ernments can be reached through a peace process similar to the UN 
negotiated peace settlement in Libya.  Section 7 will discuss steps 
that the Yemeni people and international community can take to 
consolidate support for the draft constitution and contribute to sta-
bility in Yemen. 
 
7.  WAY FORWARD 
 
In Libya and Yemen, active civil war constrained the ability of 
constitution-makers to engage in widespread participatory constitu-
tion-making—which led to protracted conflict within the drafting 
bodies and limited the ability of drafters to adopt solutions reflect-
ing national consensus.  This lack of consensus among key factions 
embedded unresolved conflicts into the draft constitutional texts.  
                                                   
269  Id. at art. 239. 
270  Id. at art. 226.  
271  Id.  
272  Id. at art. 237. 
273  Id. 
274  Id. at art. 14. 
275  GASTON, supra note 139, at 4–5; Gluck, supra note 23, at 50; Yemen’s Houthis 
Reject Draft Constitution, supra note 144. 
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Such conflict constitution-making processes require rehabilitation to 
ensure that the resulting constitutions contribute to, rather than de-
tract from, societal stability and reconciliation. 
Rehabilitated conflict constitution-making can provide for re-
vised institutional arrangements brokered as part of a peace deal, in 
anticipation that later participatory processes will allow for public 
engagement in broader institutional reforms.  The constitutions 
should include mechanisms which allow for transparency and pub-
lic participation in critical matters—one such mechanism is the de-
ferral of key issues to later enactment by a legislature, public refer-
endum or constitutional amendment. 276  Such deferred issues might 
include the drafting of electoral laws, provincial authority laws, ter-
ritorial boundaries or regional constitutions.  For example, the 2005 
Iraqi constitution deferred several difficult issues that could not be 
resolved by the constitutional drafting bodies to future legislatures 
and public referenda including a provincial powers law, electoral 
law, hydrocarbons law, and disputed territorial boundaries.277  Sim-
ilar procedural and substantive measures can be undertaken in 
Libya and Yemen. 
 
 
7.1.  Libya 
 
Libya’s conflict constitution-making process was rescued from 
its stalemate when the United Nations brokered a peace agreement 
that committed the warring governments in Tripoli and Tobruk to 
support the completion of the constitution-making process.  While 
the UN-brokered peace agreement opened up space for the comple-
tion of the draft constitution, the process under which it was drafted 
embedded certain conflicts—such as the scope of minority group 
rights and local authority—into the text.  Although the Tripoli and 
                                                   
276  See HANNA LERNER, MAKING CONSTITUTIONS IN DEEPLY DIVIDED SOCIETIES 
39–41 (2011) (arguing that incrementalist strategies of constitution-making in 
deeply divided societies allow the deferral of controversial choices to future politi-
cal institutions, which in turn allows the constitution to reflect divided perspec-
tives).  Deferral also enables more broad-based participation with regard to funda-
mental issues, once the societal and political environment improves. 
277  IRAQ CONSTITUTION Oct. 15, 2005, art. 49, 112, 122, 140.  See generally, Ashley 
S. Deeks & Matthew D. Burton, Iraq’s Constitution: A Drafting History, 40 CORNELL 
INT’L L.J. 1 (2007) (discussing and analyzing the drafting history and most signifi-
cant and controversial provisions of the 2005 constitution). 
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Tobruk based governments reached a détente regarding the comple-
tion of the draft constitution—minority group members continued 
to have reservations about the process and boycotted its final stages.  
Public participation in the constitution-making process was severely 
limited due to the security concerns. 
The Libyan constitution must be adopted by public referen-
dum.278  In order to enhance public support for the constitution, pre-
referendum and/or post-referendum processes should be devel-
oped that provide opportunities for the public and disaffected mi-
nority groups to provide input about the constitutional text.  These 
processes should include negotiations with core constituencies, pub-
lic referenda, and legislative debate.  In order to ensure broad-based 
public support for the constitution, the Libyan unity government 
should institute a pre-referendum negotiation process to reach con-
sensus with minority group representatives on constitutional provi-
sions that touch upon their concerns, such as cultural and linguistic 
protection, local autonomy, and political representation.  As minor-
ity group representatives boycotted the final stages of the drafting 
process, their constituencies are likely to oppose the constitution if 
they are not provided with an opportunity to weigh in on textual 
provisions that impact them. 
If the Libyan unity government is unable to reach consensus 
with affected communities on these issues prior to the public refer-
endum, then the public referendum should be coupled with a public 
commitment to institute a constitutional amendment process on 
provisions that are of concern to minority and local constituencies.  
The current draft of the constitution does not allow for constitu-
tional amendment until five years after the constitution has entered 
into force.279  If the most contentious issues cannot be resolved in a 
pre-referendum process, the draft constitution should be amended 
to allow for an immediate amendment process upon completion of 
the referendum.  The current draft of the constitution allows either 
the President, or a third of either legislative chamber to submit a 
provision for amendment to both chambers for approval by absolute 
majority.280  Following approval, the amendment is submitted to the 
public by referendum for approval by an absolute majority of those 
voting.281  The goal of either a pre-referendum or post-referendum 
                                                   
278  DRAFT LIBYAN CONST. art. 221, supra note 87.  
279  Id. at art. 217(1). 
280  Id. at art. 217(3)–(4). 
281  Id. at art. 217(6). 
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process would be to bring minority and local government advocates 
into the constitutional order, so that they do not resort to violent 
means to achieve their political aims. 
The draft constitution properly defers a number of issues that 
involve the distribution of power to a future legislature to resolve.  
The resolution of these issues without adequate public debate and 
deliberation could undermine reconciliation.  This approach was 
followed by the Government of Iraq after it adopted a new constitu-
tion following years of sectarian division under the brutal dictator-
ship of Sadaam Hussein.282  In both Iraq and Libya, the constitu-
tional deferral of power sharing arrangements to future legislatures 
is an acknowledgement of the long-term nature of reconciliation and 
the importance of public engagement in the resolution.  For exam-
ple, the Libyan draft constitution calls for a law to determine the ge-
ographic distribution of votes for the Presidency.283  This provision 
seeks to ensure that the President is not solely elected by populous 
urban centers and that less populous regions have a meaningful say 
in the election.  This centripetal feature of the constitution is in-
tended to promote moderate non-sectarian candidates for the Office 
of the President who will have national rather than merely regional 
appeal.  How to achieve the appropriate geographic balance is likely 
to be the subject of intensive debate as it impacts the proportionate 
influence of regions.284  The draft constitution also provides that the 
type and competencies of local government units will be determined 
by future laws.285  Similarly, any other issues that implicate minority 
group rights and local powers that remain unresolved should be de-
ferred to future legislation. 
Finally, transitional justice measures must be prioritized.  A rec-
onciliation process which addresses the abuses and oppression of 
the Qadaffi era, as well as the human rights abuses that occurred 
during the civil war, will be critical to ensuring broad based societal 
support for the emerging constitutional system.  The current draft 
                                                   
282  Darin E.W. Johnson, 2007 In Iraq: The Surge and Benchmarks – A New Way 
Forward?, 24 AM. U. INT’L. L. REV. 249, 253–254 (2008). 
283  DRAFT LIBYAN CONST., supra note 87, at art. 111. 
284  As discussed in Section 3, the topic of regional influence delayed the initial 
appointment of the constituent assembly.  There are many models for achieving a 
geographic distribution in the election of a president.  The United States has opted 
for the electoral college, while other states, such as Nigeria, have required that suc-
cessful candidates receive a minimum threshold of support from all regions, as dis-
cussed in Section 5.   
285  DRAFT LIBYAN CONST., supra note 87, at art. 155–158. 
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constitution calls for transitional justice measures that include the 
documentation of human rights violations, compensation, restitu-
tion, prosecution, and the passage of laws that ensure that the rec-
onciliation measures are effective, impartial, and reflective of the 
various segments of Libyan society.286  The immediate implementa-
tion of transitional justice measures will foster reconciliation and ad-
dress lingering grievances that might serve as a basis for a devolu-
tion back into civil war if left unaddressed. 
 
7.2.  Yemen 
 
In Yemen, transition planners organized a broadly inclusive par-
ticipatory process in the form of the National Dialogue Conference, 
with the goal that the agreed constitutional arrangements would be 
implemented by a constituent assembly.  Unfortunately, the Na-
tional Dialogue did not achieve consensus on an issue that ulti-
mately caused major factions to wage war—the federal structure of 
the state.  In order for the draft constitution—or an amended draft 
constitution—to be viable, the competing governments in Sanaa and 
Aden must arrive at a peace settlement that includes a consensus 
solution regarding the federal structure of the state and other unre-
solved issues that threaten national cohesion.  A renewal of United 
Nations backed peace talks, held from May to August 2016, appears 
to be the most viable way ahead for the resolution of issues between 
the warring parties.287  The peace negotiations could also serve as a 
forum for the resolution of several other structural and political is-
sues important to Yemeni factions that were not resolved in the 
NDC or the CDC, such as the devolution of power, balance of pow-
ers within the political party system, and transitional justice 
                                                   
286  Id. at art. 197. 
287  At the time of the writing of this article, the UN-brokered peace talks had 
been suspended.  Rod Nordland, Talks to End War in Yemen Are Suspended, N.Y. 
TIMES, (Aug. 6, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/07/world/mid-
dleeast/yemen-peace-talks-cease-fire.html [https://perma.cc/Y8CB-YDZP]; See 
Yemeni Peace Talks Enter ‘New Phase,’ as UN Envoy Announces Month-Long Pause for 
Consultations, U.N. NEWS CTR. (Aug. 6, 2016), 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=54637#.WIkIxFMrLZ4 
[https://perma.cc/4W86-M6HR] (discussing the new phase of Yemeni peace talks 
that will focus on crystallizing precise technical details among different parties to 
the conflict). 
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measures.288  Left unresolved, these issues will undermine societal 
reconciliation and public support for a new constitution.  As part of 
a peace deal, the parties must also agree to embed the consensus so-
lutions into the draft constitution and to put it forward for adoption 
by public referendum, so that the broader public has an opportunity 
to endorse the consensus solutions.289 
Regarding the federal structure of the state—Hadi loyalists will 
need to reach agreement with the Houthis and Southern Hiraak 
Movement regarding the number of regions within the federal sys-
tem and their boundaries.  Although the Southern Hiraak Move-
ment has advocated secession in the past, its leaders are open to fed-
eralism in the near term, as their representatives in the NDC 
previously supported a two-region federal structure.290  A two re-
gion federal structure is not without its problems.  The four to one 
population imbalance between the North and South would favor the 
North in population based representative bodies and could inflame 
tensions between Northern elites and Northern minority groups 
such as the Houthis, who had been politically marginalized by 
Hadi.291  As the Houthis have taken over a swath of the country by 
force, they will likely seek a political settlement that protects their 
gains in political power.  One consociational option for ensuring 
Houthi political influence would be to draw a new federal region 
comprised primarily of the Houthi homeland, which would guaran-
tee Houthi representation in national governance bodies.292 
Complex issues such as determining the specific territorial 
boundaries of the federal regions may require more time and de-
tailed negotiations than peace talks may allow; therefore, after 
framework agreements are reached during peace talks, a follow-on 
independent commission can be charged with resolving these ques-
tions.293  The draft constitution also provides that a future legislature 
will draft an elections law, regional authority law, judicial authority 
                                                   
288  Gaston, supra note 139, at 5. 
289  Currently the draft constitution is being held in limbo, as the completion 
of the document without a consensus on the federal structure of the state led the 
Houthis to take over the capital.  In order to capitalize on the work completed by 
the constituent assembly, the Houthis’ political commitment to support the draft 
constitution must be obtained through negotiations. 
290  See INT’L CRISIS GRP., supra note 143, at 13. 
291  Ghafarzade, supra note 249, at 1002. 
292  Id. at 1003–04. 
293  Id. at 1001–05. 
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law, constitutional court law, and transitional justice law.294  Defer-
ring these issues to a future legislature appropriately provides the 
public with an opportunity, through elected representatives, to have 
input on laws that impact the distribution of power and reconcilia-
tion in the reconstituted state.  To ensure multiethnic and regional 
representation, future legislatures can consider centripetal and con-
sociational options in the elections, regional authority and constitu-
tional court laws.  Particular emphasis should be given to centripetal 
options in electoral laws to encourage the moderation of views 
among political representatives.  Similarly, the transitional justice 
law should be drafted in a manner that ensures impartiality and in-
clusivity. 
 
8.  CONCLUSION 
 
This case study of “conflict constitution-making” in Libya and 
Yemen reveals that where a constitution-making process is pursued 
during active civil war, armed actors will exploit the constitution 
making process and transform it from a zone of conciliation into a 
zone of conflict, unless a political agreement is achieved that com-
mits armed actors to a consensual process.  Further, remedial 
measures must be implemented to increase public support for the 
new constitution, citizen engagement in state formation over time, 
and the election of moderates committed to maintaining the state.  
In the case of Libya, constitution-making processes were stymied by 
internal conflict, but a UN brokered political agreement created re-
newed space for the competing governments to support the constit-
uent assembly and a unified state under the new constitution.  Once 
the security environment improves, measures can be implemented 
to engage the public in the constitution-making process and in the 
development of implementing legislation that encourages moderate 
political actors.  In Yemen, the National Dialogue’s failure to achieve 
political consensus with powerful factions on fundamental issues 
catalyzed a civil war that undermined the work of constitutional 
drafters and threatened the long-term viability of the draft constitu-
tion.  A peace agreement that commits warring governments to 
peace and ends the violent conflict is a predicate to any future pro-
gress on constitutional reform.  Such progress will be dependent 
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upon measures that address the political aspirations of the politi-
cally powerful Houthi and Southern secessionist groups, and which 
commit them and the broader public to supporting a single state 
over time.  Measures that encourage the multiethnic representation 
of moderates at the national level can help to diffuse ethnic and re-
gional divisions over time. 
Ultimately, for effective constitution-making to occur, there 
must be a state to constitute.  Where civil war has destroyed the fab-
ric of the state and created warring de facto states, defined by region 
and ethnicity, a peace must be achieved committing the parties to 
the creation of one state.  That collective commitment to re-consti-
tuting the state is made effective through a consensual constitution-
making process that involves the public and incentivizes continuing 
peace and broad public commitment to the newly constituted state 
through constitutional design features specifically tailored to miti-
gate societal divisions. 
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